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 “El crecimiento económico acelerado del país es necesario para la 
generación de empleos y su desarrollo social. El desarrollo social 
del país es, a su vez, indispensable para su crecimiento económico 
y una mejor inserción en la economía mundial. Al respecto, la 
elevación del nivel de vida, la salud de sus habitantes y la 
educación y capacitación constituyen las premisas para acceder al 
desarrollo sustentable en Guatemala.” 
Peace Accords, 1996 -i- 
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This study examines the contribution of human capital to economic growth in 
Guatemala over the past 50 years.
2 The interest is twofold. First, for the country itself 
there are very few studies that thoroughly analyze past growth patterns, and there are 
no studies that empirically appraise the direct impact of education on growth. In 
general, evidence on human capital and growth comes almost entirely from cross-
country analysis. Single-country studies, however, may be more illuminating since 
they overcome the heterogeneity problem and take into account the unique historical 
information for each country. Indeed, the original motivation of studying economic 
growth focuses on the time-series dynamics of macroeconomic variables. Moreover, 
the cross-section f ocus may be inadequate if returns to education or the quality of 
education differ substantially across countries. 
Second, this study focuses on the contribution of different levels of education to 
growth. This is an important aspect regarding the problems associated with measuring 
average years of schooling. Looking at education in a disaggregated way also proves 
more fruitful to the policy-maker since it indicates how resources should be divided 
between different education levels. Finally, the empirical analysis is based on an 
error-correction methodology, deals with endogeneity, and explores several data 
construction and robustness issues. All this may be relevant for future case studies as 
well. 
This study, probably for the first time, constructs a reliable data set that accounts for 
the determinants of long-run growth in Guatemala. In terms of data availability, the 
country constitutes a most precarious case. Despite these caveats, however, 
satisfactory and coherent time series data were obtained. The results based on a 
production function augmented for human capital reveal that a better-educated labor 
force has a significant positive impact on long-run growth. Consistent with cross-
country evidence, primary and secondary education appear to be most important for 
productivity growth, followed by tertiary schooling. These findings are in agreement 
with the micro evidence for Guatemala. Interestingly, the results also suggest that the 
effect of education in both micro and macro regressions is of similar magnitude. 
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This holds while changing the conditioning set of the variables, for example by 
considering trade openness. An interesting result is that primary schooling seems to 
be particularly affected by policies that promote competitiveness. This does  not 
suggest, however, that other schooling levels are unimportant. Rather it seems that in 
Guatemala, during the past decades, a sufficient coverage and quality of primary 
education were the minimum requirement to adopt foreign technologies. Overall, the 
econometric results have been found robust, even after controlling for endogeneity as 
well as for alternative data sources. 
Finally, a modified growth-accounting framework is presented which takes into 
account quality changes of physical capital and differentiates  by the level of 
education. It shows that the human capital variables explain more than 50 percent of 
output growth. Of these, secondary schooling was the main determinant of growth. 
Due to an environment of social and political conflict, however, productivity growth 
was slightly negative over the past decades. In addition, given the increase of average 
education and a decay of the quality-adjusted physical capital at the same time, there 
is evidence of a missing complementarity between the country’s skills  and its 
technology base. Ultimately, the empirical findings point towards the importance of 
an institutional and political environment conducive to growth. 
This study is organized into eight sections. The following section briefly assesses 
patterns of growth and some of the reasons that led to a low endowment of human 
capital. Section 3 discusses how to measure the contribution of human capital to 
growth over time. Furthermore, it provides an overview of relevant empirical 
findings.  Section 4 is concerned w ith data compilation.  Section 5 introduces the 
empirical methodology and presents the main results, disaggregated by education 
level. Section 6 tests the robustness of the results. The regressions include several 
variables that help to explain the country’s growth performance, for example 
measures for the quality of capital, trade and governance. Based on these findings, 
section 7 accounts for the sources of growth. Section 8 concludes. 
 
2. Patterns of Growth in Guatemala 
To understand Guatemala’s growth patterns, and hence the role of education, its 
turbulent political and social history must be taken into account. Average annual 
growth rates were about 3.9 percent between 1951 and 2002. According to Bailén 
(2001) this is in line with the neighbor countries.
3 Due to rapid population growth, 
however, per capita growth in Guatemala has averaged only about 1.3 percent per 
                                         
3   For example, growth has been lower than in Costa Rica (4.7 percent) but higher than in 
Honduras (3.7 percent), El Salvador (3.2 percent) and Nicaragua (2.1 percent). -3- 
year. A continuation of this growth rate implies that the average Guatemalan would 
need approximately 53 years to double his real income. 
Historically, growth was not particularly pro-poor, i.e. favoring the rural or 
agricultural economy where the poor live. The elite domination and ethnic division 
failed to promote social and institutional development. Instead, growth in 
Guatemala’s was accompanied by the exclusion of large parts of the society from 
wealth, and, as a consequence, accompanied by underlying social conflict. Poverty 
rates and inequality indicators are among the highest in the Latin American region. 
According to the World Bank (2003a) about 56 percent of Guatemala’s population 
lives in poverty in 2000. 
Box 1. Guatemala: Growth with Low Productivity and Poor Social Development 
Relatively few studies focus on Guatemala’s growth experience over a long time period. One of the most 
comprehensive assessments is a voluminous study by Gómez and Ordoñez (1991). They focus on structural 
adjustment issues for the early 1990s, but their conclusions are still of interest. In particular, they claim that 
productivity in Guatemala was low because of manifold structural problems, including a deficient financial 
intermediation system and ‘resistance’ to technological change. That is, Guatemala’s international 
competitiveness was traditionally based on a low-skilled labor force with consequently poor social development 
and little incentives for firms to increase productivity. In addition, a culture of rent-seeking among entrepreneurs 
as well as public institutional and financial weakness prevented significant change. 
Guatemala’s recent growth experience can be divided into three broad episodes. 
Figure 1 visualizes annual GDP growth from 1951-2003, where selected parallel 
historical events are given from Luján (2000).
4 Table 1 presents the average output 
growth rates of primary, industry and service sectors for the period 1951-2003. In 
addition, there are three sub-periods. The growth rates of the primary sectors in 
Guatemala, which employ the majority of the rural and poor people, lagged behind 
other sectors for the entire time period. By contrast, in particular for the last decades, 
the growing sectors where those of electricity, communications and banking. Until 
approximately 1975, Guatemala appears to have had a reasonable growth 
performance, followed by a remarkable slowdown for the later periods. However, this 
requires closer examination. 
La ‘edad de oro’, 1951-1975.  During the first period Guatemala maintained 
reasonable growth rates. Ever since the 1954 coup, military governments were 
repeatedly in power, sometimes through fraudulent elections, sometimes by  coup 
d’états. In terms of its growth performance, this era is sometimes referred to as the 
‘golden period’ but the denomination is  very misleading. This is because the 
structural imbalances of the economy remained unchanged and ultimately gave rise to 
the explosion of civil strife. Annual growth was highly volatile?a fact most likely 
                                         
4   The correlations do not necessarily imply causality. Moreover, in many Latin American 
countries growth rates during the decades of the 1950s and 1960s were quite volatile as well. -4- 
associated with the dependence on agricultural export growth as well as political 
events. For example, in 1956 a new constitution was drawn up and  in 1963 
Guatemala was preparing to enter into the Central American Common Market 
(MCCA).
5 At first sight, Figure 1 suggests that the civil war’s guerilla activities — 
starting around 1960  — appeared to have an impact only on short-run growth. 
However, the later growth accounting exercise suggests that, indeed, the trend growth 
of total factor productivity (TFP) was negatively affected by the civil strife from the 
beginning. 
Figure 1. Guatemala: Economic Growth, Social Conflict and Politics, 1951-2003 
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External shocks and the civil war, 1975-1985. A second period starts shortly after the 
deterioration of the terms of trade and the international oil crisis. In 1976 a major 
earthquake affected Guatemala. After 1977, social tension culminated in a full-scale 
civil war that reached genocidal proportions in the early 1980s. Consequently, growth 
declined dramatically. Apart from causing immense human sorrow, these events 
destroyed human life and physical capital. They also imposed high costs for long-run 
growth. 
                                         
5   An excellent review of the rise and fall of the Central American integration process for 1950-
1999 can be found in de La Ossa (2000). 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on data from Banco de Guatemala. Data for 2002 (2003) is 
preliminary (estimated). Historical events are taken from Luján (2000). -5- 
Recuperation and stagnation, 1985-2002. A third episode of growth begins 
approximately in 1985 when democracy was restored, albeit with civilian 
governments patronized by the generals. Although growth rates recovered, they have 
ever since followed a more or less stagnant pattern. A cornerstone in economic and 
social development in history was the signing of the Agreement of a ‘Firm and 
Lasting Peace’ in December 1996, the formal end to the civil war. Since the signing 
of the UN-sponsored Peace Accords, Guatemala has made progress by increasing 
investments in infrastructure and human capital. It has also made some efforts to 
improve public financial management, and in the area of tax revenues. However, 
UNDP (2003a) finds that the implementation of the Peace Accords has been uneven. 
Moreover, in particular during the past decades, Guatemala seems to be affected by 
electoral cycles. This issue has been investigated by López-Cálix (2002) who indeed 
finds weak empirical evidence supporting this hypothesis. 
Box 2. Social Conflict and Guatemala’s Growth Collapse 
A key study for understanding the Guatemalan growth collapse after 1975 is Rodrik (1999). His core idea is that 
the effect of the external shocks on growth is increased within the context of ‘social conflict’ and weak institutions 
for ‘conflict management.’ The term social conflict refers to the depth of social inequality and ethic fragmentation. 
Conflict management refers to democratic institutions, an effective judiciary and a non-corrupt bureaucracy. All of 
these adjudicate distributional competition within a framework of rules and accepted procedures. However, as in 
the case of Guatemala, the economic costs of shocks can be magnified by the associated distributional conflicts. 
These are triggered because social divisions run deep and governmental as well as democratic institutions are 
weak. Consequently, the productivity of resource utilization can be diminished in a number of ways. For example, 
by delaying adjustments in fiscal policies and key relative prices, including the real exchange rate and real wages. 
In addition, these adjustments may generate uncertainty in the economic environment and paralyze the economy 
for years. Cross-country econometric evidence supports this hypothesis. Rodrik finds that countries experiencing 
the sharpest drops after 1975 were those with divided societies and weak institutions. This seems indeed to be the 
case for Guatemala, and is an important finding not only in retrospect but also for the future. 
Finally, GDP growth has declined continually since 1999. The processes behind this 
decline are not exactly understood. It is uncertain whether this represents a decrease 
in Guatemala’s trend growth or a prolonged cyclical downturn. However, it is not 
unreasonable to argue that this decline is partly associated with high levels of 
violence, kidnappings (including the central bank governor) and social unrest. In 
addition, Guatemala scores poorly on most governance indicators, particularly those 
for corruption, the rule of law and the justice system, and political stability. The 
culmination of these factors ultimately seems to damage the climate for growth and 
investment.
6 
                                         
6   Larrain (2004) analyses these issues in more detail. Hypotheses for the recent growth slowdown 
can be found in World Bank (2003b). These include restrictive macroeconomic policies, 
unfavorable external developments, the ending of the economic model relying on traditional 
agro-exports, and several political factors. As of June 2000, Guatemala is listed as non-
cooperative country in the OECD-backed ‘Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering.’  -6- 
Somewhat paradoxical, over the past decades, Guatemala has experienced relative 
macroeconomic stability. Guatemala has a rather low level of external indebtedness, 
inflation has been held back, and after a process of (uncompleted) structural reforms 
the economy is now fairly open and with low levels of protection. Thus, contrary to 
other Latin American countries, macroeconomic mismanagement may presumably 
not be regarded as the main factor to understand Guatemala’s modest performance in 
terms of per capita growth. Rather, other issues undermine Guatemala’s long-run 
growth patterns.
7 In addition to the factors already mentioned, one is low human 
capital endowment. 
Table 1. Guatemala: Sectoral Output Growth, 1951-2003 (in percent) 
a/ 
Sector  1951-03  1951-75  1976-85  1986-03 
Primary  3.2  4.2  1.6  2.7 
Agriculture, forestry, livestock and fishing  3.1  4.2  1.5  2.6 
Mining and quarrying  8.1  3.3  16.9  9.5 
Industry  4.3  5.6  2.8  3.2 
Manufacturing  4.0  5.9  2.4  2.2 
Construction  4.0  3.9  5.4  3.9 
Gas, electricity and water  8.4  9.7  6.0  8.2 
Services  4.2  5.0  2.5  3.9 
Wholesale and trade  3.8  5.0  1.3  3.3 
Transport, storage and communications  6.2  7.5  3.4  5.9 
Banking  6.9  8.3  6.1  5.3 
Public administration and defense  4.6  4.5  5.6  4.5 
Other services  3.4  4.2  2.4  2.9 
Total GDP growth  3.9  4.9  2.3  3.5 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from Banco de Guatemala. a/ Information for 2002 (2003) is 
preliminary (estimated). 
The current human capital base is essentially a product of past agricultural growth 
and eminently anti-distributional policies. The World Bank (2003a) and UNDP 
(2002) document that insufficient cheap labor, in particular for coffee, was the main 
barrier for the expansion of export crops during earlier periods. Hence, in order to 
create a low-wage labor force, the campesino and indigenous society was excluded 
from education. The plantation economy that resulted provided little incentives to 
accumulate human capital. Historically, the low level of schooling is also an outcome 
                                         
7   During a very brief episode in the early 1990s, inflation increased and fiscal discipline eroded. 
More recently, the World Bank (2003b) presents arguments suggesting that short-run growth 
may be related to the cyclical stance of fiscal and monetary policies. -7- 
of a discriminatory education system. For the attentive observer, these issues are still 
felt today. 
Table 2 shows that the country still performs poorly for indicators of education and 
health, and ranks highest among states in the region for child malnutrition, despite 
some improvements over time.
8 In addition, Guatemala spends less on education than 
any other country in the region. Based on household survey data comparing the 
education level of age cohorts, the Inter-American Development Bank (2001) finds 
that the educational gap between Guatemala and other Latin American countries is 
widening. 
Table 2. Guatemala, Central and Latin America: Comparison of Human Capital 
Indicators, 1998-2002 
Indicator 
Guatemala  Nicaragua  Honduras  El 
Salvador 
Costa 
Rica  Mexico  Latin 
America 
Public spending on education 
(in percent of GDP) (average 
1998-2000) 
c/ d/ 
1.7  5.0  4.0  2.3  5.7  4.4  N.D. 
Average years of schooling 
(2000) 
b/ 
4.8  6.3  5.3  5.1  6.7  7.9  7.3 
Net primary school 
enrollment (in percent) 
(2000-2001) 
c/ 
84  81  88  81  91  103  97 
Net secondary school 
enrollment (in percent) 
(2000-2001)
 c/ 
26  36  N.D.  39  49  60  64 
Adult illiteracy (in percent  
of total population) (2002) 
a/ 
30.1  32.9  23.8  20.3  4.2  8.3  10.5 
Infant mortality (per 1000 
births) (2001) 
a/ 
43  36  31  33  9  24  28 
Life expectancy at birth 
(years) (2002) 
a/ 
65.5  68.7  66.1  70.1  77.6  73.6  70.7 
Source: a/ World Bank (2003c). b/ Cohen and Soto (2001). c/ UNDP (2003b). d/ Notice that Guatemala’s public 
spending in education has increased recently. UNDP (2003a) reports a figure of 2.6 percent in 2002. N.D. = no data 
available. 
Historically, it may be that a certain degree of development and growth in Guatemala 
was attainable with a skilled elite and a large amount of unskilled workers. Since the 
economy has diversified over time and is now less dependent on agriculture than 
before (Segovia and Lardé 2002), the past exclusionary education policies may 
present an obstacle for future growth. On the micro level, there is evidence 
suggesting that insufficient human capital constitutes a constraint for production. For 
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example, a firm survey by Grupo de Servicios de Información (1999) indicates that 
for all firms the quality of skills ranks as the second most important constraint. For 
small firms, important for employment and income generation, the quality of skills is 
the main production constraint. 
 
3. Measuring the Contribution of Education to Growth  
The accumulation of human capital through education has long been acknowledged 
to be an important factor in the development process of a nation. Education is thought 
to be beneficial because it decreases inequality, improves the quality of life, and in 
particular it is a factor in rising the income level and facilitating economic growth. 
This section will concentrate on the latter effect and summarize some evidence on the 
relationship between education and growth. 
3.1 Augmented Solow Model and Endogenous Growth 
The existing literature contains a number of distinct conceptual rationales for the 
inclusion of human capital in models of economic growth. According to Sianesi and 
van Reenen (2003), the two main macro approaches are the augmented Solow model 
and the new growth theories. 
Augmented Solow Model 
One way to estimate the impact of education on growth is to adapt the Solow (1956) 
model. The augmented version extends the basic framework to allow human capital 
as an extra input to enter the production function. In particular Mankiw et al. (1992) 
show that traditional growth theory can accommodate human capital and provide a 
reasonable approximation for empirical analysis. At the economy-wide level, it may 
also take into account human capital externalities. Still, one of the key insights is that 
the factor accumulation affects the  level of income, but per se is insufficient to 
achieve long-run growth. Long-run growth depends rather on growth in technological 
progress. Human capital accumulation may therefore have only a short-term impact 
on the rate of growth. 
However, rates of accumulation are expected to have explanatory power for growth 
rates during the transition to an  eventual equilibrium growth path. In particular, 
considering the case of Guatemala? presumably far away from a balanced growth 
process? consideration of transition could open up the possibility of assessing the 
macroeconomic role of education for economic growth within this framework. In 
addition, since the ‘short run’ in the context of growth theory is often thought of in 
terms of decades, these effects can be worthwhile policy objectives. Up to now, for 
the reasons clarified below, this approach has remained the workhorse of applied 
empirical research. The model is fairly flexible and allows for alternative 
specifications that can be adjusted to best match the available data. -9- 
Endogenous Growth Approach  
Expanding these ideas, new growth theories emphasize the endogenous determination 
of technological progress, which is determined within the model. Thus, long-run 
growth can be affected by government policies instead of being driven by exogenous 
technological change. With respect to human capital, the endogenous growth 
approach argues that there should be an additional effect over and above the static 
effect on the level of output. Models that explain long-run growth by  focusing on 
technological progress and research and development, such as Romer (1990a) and 
Grossman and Helpman (1991), argue that domestic technological progress results 
from the search for innovations. The discovery of an innovation, undertaken by 
profit-maximizing individuals, raises productivity and is ultimately the source of 
long-run growth. This kind of model attributes growth to the existing stock of human 
capital. A second category is the model of Lucas (1988). It broadens the concept of 
capital and suggests that human capital accumulation may be an engine of growth 
itself, due to spillover effects that negate diminishing returns in production. 
In particular, with respect to developing countries, one way of characterizing the role 
of human capital is the consideration of technology transfer from innovating 
countries. Already Nelson and Phelps (1966) suggested that education facilitates the 
adoption and implementation of new technologies, which are continuously invented. 
For example, countries with lagging technological capacity may be most able to 
catch-up if they have a large stock of human capital. In this case, the level of human 
capital effects growth by facilitating improvements in productivity. Also Lucas 
(1990) conjectures that physical capital does not flow from rich to poor countries 
because of a relatively low stock of complementary human capital. 
In a rather influential study, Benhabib and Spiegel (1994) propose an empirical 
growth model in which human capital externalities can be considered in subsequent 
advances in education and in new physical capital via technology import. Their 
results indeed suggest that human capital impacts growth through two mechanisms. 
On the one side, human capital seems to influence the rate of domestically produced 
innovation, as proposed in the endogenous growth model of Romer (1990a). On the 
other side, in the spirit of Nelson and Phelps (1966), they claim that the human 
capital stock affects the speed of adoption of technology from abroad. More recently, 
in a generalized version of their model of technology diffusion?that allows for a 
nonlinear specification of total factor productivity growth?Benhabib and Spiegel 
(2003) find that a minimum initial human capital level is necessary to exhibit catch-
up in productivity relative to the leader nation.  
However, Pritchett (2001) agues convincingly that the finding of only a level effect 
on growth is rather puzzling. First, in the framework of endogenous growth, spillover 
effects of knowledge should be in addition to rather instead of the production effects 
of human capital. In other words, finding only spillover effects may be inconsistent 
with the micro evidence on the returns to education. Second, as will be stressed in -10- 
more detail in the next section, Jones (1995) criticism of endogenous growth models 
applies here. That is, growth rates cannot be made a function of non-stationary 
parameters unless cointegration between the variables is accepted. 
3.2 Some Implications for Empirical Testing 
Distinguishing between the role of education as a factor of production, and as a factor 
that facilitates technology absorption and the production of knowledge, is significant. 
Any policy measure which raises the level of human capital may only have a one-
and-for-all effect in the first framework, but will increase the growth rate of the 
economy forever in the second one. In such cases, the estimated increase in 
productivity is not simply a phenomenon in the transitional period since an increase 
in the flow of education leads to a gradual increase in human capital stock. Implicit is 
the claim that by increasing the level of education the rate of economic growth will 
increase over time. Empirically, however, there is no consensus over which is the 
appropriate approach. 
Observational Equivalence  
A main problem for empirical testing at the macro level emerges from observational 
equivalence. This means that, despite a number of different ways of hypothesizing 
how human capital can affect growth, empirical analysis can yield similar predictions 
regarding the relationship between some human capital variables and some variables 
of income growth. In other words, apart from data uncertainty, the empirical research 
seeking to test these alternatives has been hampered by the use of relatively similar 
econometric specifications. Insofar, macro regressions do not readily allow testing 
one theory against another. Rather they tend to emphasize an expanded set of 
variables as suggested by the literature. Consequently, Romer (1990b) argues that the 
role of an endogenous growth framework is not to generate testable predictions, but 
rather to guide the process of data analysis. 
The Jones Critique  
A second criticism, especially relevant for the present study, is the seminal 
contribution of Jones (1995). Testing endogenous growth models in the context of 
time series implies establishing a relationship between a variable that is usually 
stationary?without drift?such as income growth, and a variable which is usually 
non-stationary, such as years of schooling. In other words, his results fundamentally 
call into question the implicit prediction of many endogenous growth models 
suggesting output growth should exhibit large permanent increases. Time series data 
over a very long time period for the United States and other OECD countries reveal 
that the growth rates of GDP per capita in these countries exhibit little persistent 
changes, and can be characterized by more or less constant mean. 
This observation imposes a testable prediction. According to endogenous growth 
models permanent changes in certain policy variables, such as schooling, or the 
number of scientists and engineers engaged in research and development, should have -11- 
permanent effects on the rate of economic growth. Empirically, however, neither in 
the United States nor in other OECD countries does economic growth seem to exhibit 
such an effect. Incidentally, albeit for different reasons than in the OECD countries, 
these stationarity properties seem to be equally true for schooling and income growth 
in the Guatemalan data, as demonstrated in the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests 
in the Appendix. 
3.3 More Evidence on Education and Growth 
Empirical studies usually take the form of regression analysis and typically look at 
many more explanatory variables than human capital. A large number of papers have 
found one or more variables that correlate with growth. In fact, their number is very 
large and the question arises which combinations of these variables are actually 
robust. In the context of the present study, some of these findings will be outlined 
next. 
Weak Correlations  
While there is strong theoretical support for a key role of human capital in growth, 
Sala-i-Martin (2002), Easterly (2001) and in particularly Pritchett (2001) argue that 
the empirical relationship between education and growth is weak.
9 However, more 
specifically, Temple (2001) points out that fragile correlation in cross-country data 
may be due to measurement error and influential exceptions. Also, some kinds of 
relationships are more robust that others. For example, what is less clear and weak is 
the relationship of educational growth rates on output growth, the role of different 
education levels, and differences in effects of female and male education on growth. 
By contrast, some measures of health seem to be positively correlated with growth. In 
addition to human capital, many other factors have been found to be important for 
growth. Following Barro (2001), these include institutions, such as free markets, 
secure property rights and the rule of law. Similarly, more open economies and 
countries with lower initial inequality appear to experience higher growth. 
Conditional Convergence  
One much debated prediction of neoclassical growth models is that of convergence. 
Poor countries should grow relatively faster than rich countries if countries are 
similar with respect to their structural parameters for preferences and technology. The 
cross-country studies by Mankiw et al. (1992), Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) and 
Barro (2001) find some evidence of convergence, albeit in a modified form. More 
                                         
9   Pritchett (2001) uses measures of the growth rate of human capital and finds a negative impact 
on output growth. Easterly (2001) argues that human capital accumulation is not a panacea. He 
emphasizes indirect ways that explain technological progress and factor accumulation by 
looking at the features of economies that facilitate them, such as government policies and 
structural issues. -12- 
specifically, among other things, convergence is found conditional upon a country’s 
initial human capital stock. Therefore, a poor country on average may grow faster, 
but only if the poor country’s human capital stock is above the amount initially 
expected at the level of per capita income. 
Reverse Causality  
Most of the evidence of some sort of relationship between education and growth is 
based on statistical  correlations. From these correlations, it  has been generally 
inferred that higher levels of education cause higher growth. One critique of these 
findings comes from Bils and Klenow (2000) who suggest reverse causation. Based 
on a calibrated micro-foundation model, they claim that faster growth induces people 
to stay longer in school. In other words, the channel from schooling to growth that is 
assumed to dominate in many models cannot explain all the observed correlation 
between education and growth. However, the reverse channel provides some 
explanation. Therefore, in an econometric framework, schooling should be treated as 
an endogenous input with respect to income. This implies making use of econometric 
methods for dealing with this problem. 
Few Individual Case Studies  
Recent research has mainly relied on cross-country regression analysis. However, the 
original motivation of studying economic growth focuses on the time-series dynamics 
of macroeconomic variables. In addition, the cross-section focus may be inadequate if 
rates of return to education or the quality of education differ substantially across 
countries. Unfortunately, with respect to human capital, there are very few studies 
that analyze a single country over a certain time period.  
The exception is a study from Jenkins (1995) using time series data from 1971-1992 
for the United Kingdom. Still, the limited size of her time series sample makes it 
difficult to draw firm conclusions that can be generalized. Also Pissarides (2000) 
summarizes single case studies for India, Egypt, Tanzania and  Chile. Part of an 
OECD project, these studies were to provide a more thorough test of the relation 
between human capital and growth in a single country context. For the case of India, 
the study less plagued with methodological or data problems, the regressions show a 
significant contribution of human capital on industrial output growth. The estimate 
suggests that an increase in the average number of years of schooling by 1 year 
should raise output by about 30 percent. 
Magnitude of the Education Effect  
In the augmented Solow model, the role of education can be inferred from estimates 
of the regression coefficients. However, with reference to the empirical research 
reviewed in Sianesi and van Reenen (2003), there is no agreement on its magnitude. 
In principle, there would be positive empirical evidence in favor of a macroeconomic 
productivity effect of education if the elasticity of human capital resembles the share -13- 
of human capital in factor income. As a measure of reference, one can calculate the 
share of human capital in labor income from back-of-the-envelope calculations.  
For example, Mankiw et al. (1992) consider the minimum wage as the return to labor 
with no education. Historically, the minimum wage has been between 30 to 50 
percent of average wage income in the United States. On this account, it would 
follow that the return to education equals about 50 to 70 percent in labor income, 
which is about 70 percent of total factor income. Obviously, the problem with this 
kind of calculation is that in developing countries the minimum wage is less enforced 
and less likely applicable.
10 Pritchett (2001) therefore uses an estimation based on the 
distribution of wages. Either of these calculations suggest that the human capital 
coefficient should be at least 
1/3. 
Effects of Education Levels 
Somewhat surprisingly, relatively few studies at the macro level address the question 
of level-specific education effects. The view that schooling does not have the same 
impact on economic growth at different education levels is b ased on the labor 
economics literature. Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (2002) provide a comprehensive 
review on the rates of return to education. International evidence suggests that returns 
vary according to the education level. Lower income countries tend to have higher 
returns to schooling. If education has economic externalities?such as expanding 
well-being and the technological possibilities of the economy?the true benefits of 
education may be better captured by the study of different education levels on 
economic growth. This is because the computation of rates of returns based on micro 
data can only measure the effects of education through individual’s wages. However, 
this might not hold in macro analysis. 
Within an endogenous growth framework one can also derive a distinct role for each 
education level. The intuition here is that primary education provides individuals with 
basic cognitive skills that enhance productivity in the production of final goods, but 
only post-primary education facilitates the absorption of new technologies, and 
enables individuals to contribute to the production of knowledge. Empirically, in the 
framework of the augmented Solow model, treating each education level as a separate 
input into production can quantify the role of primary, secondary and tertiary 
schooling. While the standard approach in the literature is to consider an aggregate 
measure of human capital, there are some exceptions that will be briefly reviewed 
now. 
                                         
10   In Guatemala, the legal minimum wage currently amounts to approximately 3-5 U.S. dollars per 
day (UNDP 2003a). While the legal minimum wages are relatively high with respect to average 
wages, about 
1/2 of workers in Guatemala earn less than the legal minimum wage. This is 
because of weak enforcement and the fact that self-employed workers are not subject to the 
minimum wage regulation. -14- 
Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) regress the growth rate of GDP per capita for a large 
sample of countries on initial income and a set of control variables. Four measures of 
educational attainment are always present. These are average years of male secondary 
and higher schooling as well as average years of female s econdary and higher 
schooling. The male education variables have a jointly significant impact on growth. 
The female variables enter sometimes with a negative sign. One possible 
interpretation, advocated by Barro, is that females are discriminated in the formal 
labor markets. Another explanation for this rather ‘puzzling’ finding could be simply 
due to collinearity of the education variables.
11 Other regressions include average 
years of female and male primary education. None of these variables are found to be 
significant. Barro (2001) has continued to investigate the relations between education 
and growth using the same methodology. An important finding here is that school 
quality is much more important to growth than its quantity. Overall, the studies do not 
make very clear the effect of education levels on growth given the negative 
contribution of secondary female schooling, and the insignificant result for primary 
education. 
Another paper that investigates the link between education levels and growth is 
Petrakis and Stamatakis (2002). In a cross-country regression with a relatively small 
sample size they consider three groups of countries: advanced, developed and less 
developed. The empirical results suggest that the link of education and growth varies 
with  respect to a country’s level of development. Primary education is more 
important in less developed countries, while higher education seems dominant in 
advanced countries. In fact, there is some similarity with Gemmel (1996) who also 
distinguishes between p rimary, secondary and tertiary schooling for these three 
groups of countries. He argues that the effects of human capital on growth are most 
apparent at the primary and secondary levels in developing countries, but at the 
tertiary level for OECD countries. Unfortunately, the findings in both studies do not 
allow one to assess with certainty the role of secondary education. In fact, it 
sometimes enters with a negative sign. 
Finally, based on a framework similar to Benhabib and Spiegel, Papageorgiou (2003) 
is also concerned to empirically determine the contribution of primary and post-
primary education on growth. In a cross-country regression he finds that primary 
education contributes mainly to the production of final output, whereas post-primary 
education contributes to the adoption and innovation of technology. When the data is 
divided into subsamples, the results are less encouraging. However, the implicit claim 
                                         
11   Klasen (2002) argues that the education variables are generally correlated. Empirically, this 
makes it difficult to identify individual effects of female and male education. However, the 
negative effect for female secondary education disappears once regional dummy variables are 
incorporated into econometric models. This finding may be due to East Asia’s large initial 
gender gaps in the  1960s, and the combination of low economic growth and comparatively 
lower gender gaps in Latin America. -15- 
is that for the poorest countries human capital acts mainly as input into final 
production and,  to a lesser extent, as a facilitator for innovation. The relative 
contribution of human capital to innovation seems to increase with country wealth. 
Overall this is an interesting study. Nevertheless, the analysis ignores the Jones 
(1995) critique, and the conclusions are ultimately derived from a priori assumptions. 
3.4 Summing-Up 
Empirical results often do not allow for a clear-cut measurement of the 
macroeconomic role of education on growth, and theory seems to be much ahead of 
empirics. Cross-country evidence suggests that the relative importance of education 
level varies by the degree of a country’s development. Results that come close to a 
priori expectation of the magnitude of human capital on growth seem to share three 
properties. First, a specification  of the underlying regression that is based on a 
production function. Second, in particular regarding human capital, empirical data of 
reasonable quality. And finally, a functional form of the regression equation that 
tends to reduce econometric problems. 
Attempts to measure empirically the impact of education on growth can be divided 
into two broad categories. The augmented Solow model originates the first class, 
while the second group is inspired by an endogenous growth approach. However, this 
is rather a conceptual framework for thinking about growth, which can be useful in 
the analysis of data, but does not generate a set of easily testable equations nor sharp 
quantitative predictions. In the light of observational equivalence and given the 
problems associated with testing endogenous growth models in a time series context, 
the following analysis will be based on a production function augmented for human 
capital. Nevertheless, some attention will be given to variables that proxy for trade 
openness and technological innovation, and their joint impact on education. 
 
4. Data Compilation in a Post-Conflict Country 
Guatemala is definitely deficient in easily accessible data. Thus, to identify the 
macroeconomic impact of education on economic growth, a primary task is to 
overcome information constraints. It is important to note that a significant fraction of 
the economic activity in Guatemala can be found in the informal sectors. Since this 
lack of documentation does not influence all factors equally, there remains a potential 
bias that cannot always be traced. 
However, satisfactory and coherent results can be obtained. A sizable amount of 
information, although not easily accessible, can be compiled from disperse or bulky 
individual files. Even for local experts, this is a challenging task. The lack of a 
consistent compilation of data to allow a serious analysis of growth patterns hampers 
inter-temporal comparisons and, more generally, research of development patterns for -16- 
the country. Given these constraints, so far, there is very limited empirical research 
on virtually any macroeconomic topic in Guatemala. 
The following paragraphs describe the data needed for the analysis that follows. 
These are measures for the human and physical capital stock and the labor force, and 
quality indices for human and physical capital. Information other than that reported in 
this section is listed in the Appendix. The time series are mainly from Banco de 
Guatemala, and, in the case of educational statistics, from the Ministry of Education 
and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. 
4.1 Human Capital Stock 
The human capital stock of Guatemala is defined by average years of schooling 
evident in the labor force.
12 In line with most empirical analyses, this study assumes 
that years of schooling provides a reasonable approximation of the human capital 
stock, although it should be briefly stressed that the indicator is incomplete for 
several reasons.  
(1) Education as proxy variable. Human capital is multifaceted and includes a 
complex set of human attributes. As a consequence, the genuine level of human 
capital is hard to measure in quantitative form. At best, average years of schooling 
can be regarded as a proxy for the component of the human capital stock obtained in 
schools. Therefore, in a later robustness test, life expectancy at birth will be included 
in the regressions. Life expectancy is commonly viewed as a companion indicator to 
educational capital that captures the effect of health. 
(2) Quality changes. Average years of schooling measurements do not take into 
account quality changes within the education system. Quality changes may 
complicate comparison of schooling effects on growth over time as well as making 
comparisons with other countries difficult. Bratsberg and Terrel (2002), CIEN (2002) 
and the World Bank (1995c) argue that the quality of the education system in 
Guatemala is rather low, and may not have shown much improvement over time. 
(3) Aggregation bias. Average years of schooling raise human capital by an equal 
amount regardless of whether a person is enrolled in a primary, secondary or tertiary 
school. This is an important point because by defining human capital by average 
years of schooling, one implicitly gives the same weight to any year of schooling 
acquired by a person. This completely disregards the findings of the microeconomic 
literature on wage differentials. For example, Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (2002) 
suggest that the rates of return to education could be decreasing with the acquisition 
                                         
12   The use of labor force instead of total population data is due to problems regarding the 
Guatemalan population data for the 1980s. By contrast, the l abor force proxy used here is 
assumed to take into account some of the effects of the civil war, i.e. migration and 
displacement. -17- 
of additional schooling. Therefore, in order to capture the impact of education on 
growth better, a more complete picture will be presented by analyzing the role of 
primary, secondary and tertiary schooling. 
After making some modifications to account for the statistical circumstances in 
Guatemala, the following procedure for constructing estimates of the human capital 
stock is used, based on the attainment census method advocated by Barro and Lee 
(2001). The use of a perpetual inventory method that employs census and survey 
information on educational attainment as benchmark figure can be seen as a major 
advantage over previous methodologies. The benchmarks are taken from various 
national censuses and surveys, see Table 3. Guatemalan statistics report distributional 
attainment stratified by age and sex in five cases: no formal education, first cycle of 
primary, second cycle of primary, first cycle of secondary, second cycle of primary 
and tertiary education. The data has been summarized into 4 broad categories, that is, 
no school, some primary, some secondary and some tertiary education. 
The procedure starts to construct current flows of adult population, which are added 
to the initial benchmark stocks of the labor force (taken for 1950 from the Barro and 
Lee 2001 data set). The formulas for the three levels of schooling for the labor force 
aged 15 and over are as follows: 
(1)  ) 1 ( 15 ) 1 ( 1 1 , 0 , 0 - - - ￿ + - ￿ = t t t t t PRI L HN HN d  
(2)  ) ( 15 ) 1 ( 1 1 , 1 , 1 t t t t t t SEC PRI L HN HN - ￿ + - ￿ = - - d  
(3)  t t t t t t t TER L SEC L HN HN ￿ - ￿ + - ￿ = - 20 15 ) 1 ( 1 , 2 , 2 d  
(4)  t t t t t TER L HN HN ￿ + - ￿ = - 20 ) 1 ( 1 , 3 , 3 d  
where 
HNj  =  number of the economically active population for whom j is the highest 
level of schooling attained (j=0 for no school, j=1 for primary, j=2 for 
secondary and j=3 for higher education) 
PRI  =  enrollment ratio for primary education 
SEC  =  enrollment ratio for secondary education 
TER  =  enrollment ratio for tertiary education 
L  =  number of the economically active population 
L15  =  number of persons aged 15 
L20  =  number of persons aged 20 -18- 
dh,t  =  mortality rate of the human capital stock. 















and assumes that the mortality rate (which also includes the exit of the economically 
active population due to retirement or inactivity)  is independent of the level of 
schooling attained, which is not entirely correct. The term  Lt–L15t describes the 
number of survivals from the previous period, which are subtracted from Lt-1 in order 
to estimate the total number of missing persons. Equation (5) as such describes the 
proportion of the labor force which did not survive from the previous period. The 
formulas can be rearranged to create the final equations that were used to generate the 
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The procedure requires school enrollment ratios that are crucial for exact calculations, 
but the proper accounting for Guatemala is not easy. Even though net enrollment 
ratios would be more precise for estimating the accumulation of human capital, gross 
enrollment ratios are used, as only this data is available. As reported in the Appendix, 
the ratios are taken from various yearbooks of the Guatemalan Ministry of Education 
(MINEDUC) for the 1990s, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization (UNESCO) for earlier periods, and other sources available for 
Guatemala. The data for primary, secondary and tertiary enrollment ratios have been 
found consistent over time. Interpolation techniques were used to fill gaps in the data, 
but the use of this approach was kept to a minimum. The tertiary enrollment time 
series were more difficult to compile and required greater use of interpolated 
estimates. -19- 
In general, the estimated attainment data compares favorably with the census and 
survey information. The less accurate fit for 1981 is here believed to be due to large 
measurement errors or the possible manipulation of the census, which took place 
during the peak of the armed conflict in Guatemala. Consequently, this discrepancy 
was not smoothed over. Equally, data for 1998 differs slightly from the estimate. This 
is due to the fact that the survey largely oversamples the urban population of the 
economy in that year. Given the simplicity of the assumptions of the underlying 
model, however, the overall results have been found quite satisfactory. 
Table 3. Guatemala: Education Level of Labor Force, 1950-2002 (in percent) 
a/ 
Year  Source  No school  Some Primary  Some 
Secondary 
Some Tertiary 
1950  SEGEPLAN (1978)  72.3  24.9  2.3  0.5 
1964  SEGEPLAN (1978)  60.7  33.4  4.7  1.2 
1973  SEGEPLAN (1978)  51.7  40.8  6.1  1.4 
1981  CENSO (1981)  (37.7)  (48.7)  (10.9)  (2.7) 
1989  ENS (1989)  38.9  47.7  11.4  2.1 
1994  CENSO (1994)  35.4  47.8  14.1  2.7 
1998  ENIGFAM (1998)  (30.8)  (50.3)  15.9  3.1 
2000  ENCOVI (2000)  28.9  48.6  16.5  6.0 
2002  ENEI 1 (04-05/2002)  26.9  49.3  19.3  4.5 
2002  ENEI 2 (08-09/2002)  24.7  50.8  19.3  5.2 
2002  ENEI 3 (10-11/2002)  25.0  48.7  21.0  5.3 
Source: Compiled from census and survey data, ENCOVI and ENEI figures are from UNDP Guatemala. a/ 
Brackets indicate uncertain figures. Discrepancies are due to rounding. 
In any case, simply employing gross enrollment ratios would overestimate the 
accumulation of human capital. Gross enrollment ratios are defined as the ratio of 
total enrollment in the respective schooling level to the population of the age group 
that is expected to be enrolled at that level. Thus, gross enrollment ratios can exceed 
1 and therefore exaggerate the true amount of enrollment when students repeat, which 
is often the case in Guatemala.
13 In response to this problem and in order to 
benchmark the estimated educational attainment data with census and survey 
information, the gross enrollment ratios have been adjusted by a depreciation factor 
for the respective education level, as reported in Loening (2004). 
                                         
13   The use of net enrollment ratios is hampered by large data gaps. Also, net enrollment ratios 
introduce large measurement errors if there are under- or over-aged children starting at each 
level of education, see Barro and Lee (2001). In Guatemala students who start late constitute a 
significant fraction of total enrollment—in particular for primary schooling. -20- 
Finally, the formula to construct the measure for the human capital stock combines 
the estimated attainment data with the information on the duration of each schooling 
level. It is given as: 
(10)  t j
j






where ht stands for the average years of schooling, hrj is the estimated attainment 
ratio of the labor force and dj is the average number of years of education received in 
the respective schooling level j. Average education values have been calculated from 
the Encuesta Nacional Socio-Demográfica (ENS) from 1989 and are assumed to have 
remained constant over time. This may result in a slight overestimate of the human 
capital stock for the period prior to 1989 and underestimate the average years of 
schooling for later periods. However, data from more recent household surveys 
suggest that this assumption may not be a large source of error. 







50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 00
  Barro/Lee Cohen/Soto   Nehru/Dareshwar   Estimate  
 
Source: Author’s calculations, as well as Barro and Lee (2001), Cohen and Soto (2001), and Nehru et al. (1995) 
education data.  
How do these calculations compare to other sources? The correlation coefficients 
between the estimated average years of schooling here and those provided by Soto 
(2002), Barro and Lee (2001), and Nehru et al. (1995), using different techniques and 
data sources, all exceed 0.95 in the case of Guatemala. Figure 2 compares the results. 
The time series shown by the solid line harmonizes to a large extent with alternative 
estimates at different points of time. Unlike the Barro and Lee data set, there is no -21- 
implausible jump for 1980. The Cohen and Soto (2002) estimate provides the closest 
approximation. Additionally, not shown by Figure 2, the average years of schooling 
estimates here come close to values obtained from census and survey data. For 
example, Psacharopoulos and Arriagada (1986) report that mean education in the 
labor force was in the order of 1.7 for 1964. Edwards (2002) reports a value of 4.3 
years for 2000. According to the estimate here, average years of schooling was in the 
order of 1.9 years in 1964 and 4.4 years in 2000. 
A closer look at Figure 2 yields two important descriptive outcomes. First, the data 
suggest that mean education evident in the labor force slightly declined during the 
early 1990s. This outcome is associated with the disastrous effect of the civil war on 
the country’s human capital base. Those disadvantaged cohorts from the 1980s 
entered later into the labor force. Second, there has been substantial increase in the 
average years of schooling within the economically active population since 1998. 
This can be attributed to improvements within the education system and increased 
attention to education after the signing of the 1996 Peace Accords. 
Even so, as it can be appreciated from Figure 2, this increased attention to education 
only has compensated for the loss of educational capital caused by civil strife. 
Consequently, recent educational progress does not represent a major improvement 
regarding the long-run growth of the country’s human capital base. In this context, it 
is worth recalling that educational attainment in Guatemala remains lowest compared 
to other Latin American countries. 
4.2 Labor Force 
The measure of labor quantity here is the economically active population. For 
Guatemala there are several estimates. The National Statistic Institute (INE) provides 
calculations different from those of the Ministry of Work, both of which date back to 
1980. Based on census and survey data, estimates for selected years have also been 
provided by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) for Guatemala. 
The labor force is usually defined as the working and job-seeking population, but the 
different calculations do not always reveal what underlies the specific assumptions 
and age definitions used for calculations. To develop a consistent time series of the 
economically active population, the International Labor Organisation (ILO) has used 
information on age specific labor force participation rates and population statistics. 
Unfortunately, for the reasons clarified below, these estimates are unreliable. 
(1) Data discrepancies. First, there is no agreement either on the level or on the 
growth rates of the labor force. Virtually all data is different from each other. For 
example, UNDP (2003a) reports a total labor force estimate of about 2.84 million for 
1989, as compared to 2.54 million from INE or 2.95 million from ILO. Second, as 
typical for estimates in other countries, labor force data should show some cyclical 
fluctuations as labor responds to higher output growth. Official estimates for 
Guatemala, however, are remarkably free of  any fluctuations and follow a -22- 
monotonous trend. This suggests reliance on population statistics or use of 
interpolation techniques. 
(2) Omission of the civil strife. Most importantly, these estimates do not take into 
account migration flows and the consequences of the civil war on the economically 
active population. Especially the last point devalues official estimates. According to 
the Commission for Historical Clarification (1999), the internal military conflict left 
an estimated 200,000 civilians dead and another 1 million displaced, for a total 
population of about 10 million. Such an immense impact of the civil strife should be 
reflected somewhere in the statistics?but it is not. 
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Source: Author’s calculations based on Banco de Guatemala (2003), INE and ILO data. 
In the absence of reliable information about the economically active population from 
these sources, labor is here proxied by the number of private contributors to the 
Guatemalan Social Security System (IGSS). The reliance on the number of private 
contributors to the Social Security System in order to account adequately for the 
economically active population is also adopted in an IMF study for the case of El 
Salvador by Morales (1998), and for Guatemala by Prera (1999). The numbers 
representing the labor force are calculated by assuming that the social security -23- 
contributors account for approximately 25 percent of the total labor force.
14 The 
participation rate has a negligible impact on the later calculations and is based on a 
historical mean value.  
Although a broad approach may limit the precision of calculations, the regressions in 
sections 5 and 6 show that the variable has a high explanatory power on growth. 
Moreover, as can be seen from Figure 3, the estimated values give a more reasonable 
picture than the data from official sources. Notice that the level of the economically 
active population, but not its growth rate, is basically in line with ILO or INE 
calculations. In 1980s, when the civil war had already taken genocide proportions, the 
labor force dropped dramatically by about 660,000.
15 For recent years, the estimate 
for the economically active population derived from IGSS statistics comes close to 
INE data. 
4.3 Physical Capital Stock 
Internationally, the Perpetual Inventory Method (PIM) is a common way to estimate 
capital stock, but there are uncertainties associated with the calculation. In general, 
due to the lack of information about the initial capital stock, questionable validity of 
assumptions about the rate of depreciation, a nd lack of information about the 
utilization of capital, estimates should be taken with care. With these reservations in 
mind, the PIM was used to construct the physical capital stock for Guatemala. The 
following paragraphs present two distinct calculations, one with aggregated and 
another with disaggregated investment data. 
Estimate with Aggregated Investment Data  
The physical capital stock that is used throughout the subsequent analyses is 
computed using the PIM with aggregated investment data. The procedure argues that 
the stock of capital is the accumulation of the stream of past investments: 
(11)  t K t t I K K + - ￿ = - ) 1 ( 1 d  
where  K is the capital stock,  I gross fixed capital formation,  dK the annual 
depreciation rate of the capital stock, and t an index for time. The initial value of the 
capital-output ratio for 1950 is taken from the Nehru and Dhareshwar (1993) data 
                                         
14   UNDP (2003a) reports a participation rate of 24.5 percent (2002). Based on INE data, as 
reported by Global Info Group (1999), this compares to 27.6 percent (1995), 29.9 percent 
(1990) and 28.2 percent (1985). 
  
15   It should be emphasized that the reliance on IGSS data may understate the drop of the 
economically active population during the 1980s. This is because the working population in the 
informal and rural sectors—typically not captured by the social security system—was 
particularly affected by violence and displacement policies. -24- 
set.
16 Information about gross fixed capital formation was provided directly by the 
Economic Research Department of the Banco de Guatemala. The data is compiled 
using the somewhat dated 1953 UN System of National Accounts, which is currently 
under revision.
17 In line with other studies for Latin America, such as Loayza et al. 
(2002) and Morales (1998), the overall depreciation rate is assumed at 5 percent. This 
is still a rather high estimate when compared with more commonly used thumb 
values.  
However, regarding the armed conflict, which has lasted for 36 years, and several 
periods of high violence in Guatemala, it was found useful  to adopt a high 
depreciation rate in order to account for both capital destruction and distraction from 
productive use. For example, the latter may have resulted in unprofitable military 
spending, several forms of non-productive investments, or temporary spare capital 
because of infrastructure deficiencies. As to be shown in the following section, the 
results of the regression analyses are not sensitive to moderate adjustments in the 
depreciation rate. In terms of data availability over a long time period, and given the 
robustness to alternative assumptions about depreciation, the capital stock series with 
aggregated investment data is adopted in the later regression analyses.  
Estimate with Disaggregated Investment Data  
Based on the PIM, Morán and Valle (2002) present a second approach for Guatemala. 
In their model the capital stock is estimated for eight broad asset groups for 1971-
2000. However, presumably because of too high depreciation rates for public and 
private construction, they seem to underestimate the genuine level of the capital 
stock.
18 Following their methodology but applying different depreciation rates and 
taking into account the initial benchmark estimate from Nehru and Dareshwar (1993), 
a second capital stock series has been calculated with disaggregated investment data 
for the period 1970-2002. 
The initial values are obtained from a pre-estimate starting in 1950. The data gaps for 
the sectoral composition of the eight assets groups prior to 1970 are filled in by 
extrapolation techniques. These values, however, do not enter in the later regression 
or growth accounting exercise. They only provide reasonable initial values for the 
                                         
16   The potential error of the estimate of initial capital stock diminishes over time due to 
depreciation. Based on international data, Nehru and Dhareshwar (1993) offer an estimate of 
the capital stock for Guatemala that was taken as a benchmark. 
 
17   UNDP (2002) provides a brief summary of the associated empirical consequences and causes 
that prevented an actualization of the Guatemalan National Accounts. 
 
18   In addition, the following results of the quality index for the physical capital stock differ. This 
may be due to the possibility of an oversight in the logarithmic transformation by Morán and 
Valle (2002), as was pointed out in a personal communication with Estuardo Morán, Banco de 
Guatemala, October 15, 2003. -25- 
disaggregated capital stock. Table 4 presents the assumed average life service lines 
for each of these assets groups. The average service life for a given class of asset is 
considered to be identical for all kinds of economic activities. The service lives are 
arrived at by considering the nature of these asset groups, consulting experts, and a 
careful review of the average service lives used by other countries, as reported in 
OECD (2001b). 
Based on average service life estimates, geometric depreciation rates are applied. 
With geometric depreciation, the market value in constant prices is assumed to 
decline at a constant rate within each period. The implicit depreciation factor for each 
asset group is set at a value that ensures that the initial value will have been reduced 
to 10 percent of the original value by the time it reaches the end of its expected 
service life. The main drawback of geometric depreciation is that it will never exhaust 
the full value of an asset. That is, the depreciated value of the asset falls 
asymptotically, approaching, but never reaching, zero. While the infinity problem is 
somewhat troublesome, geometric depreciation has the practical advantage of being 
suited better for benchmark estimates, such as in the present study. 
Table 4. Guatemala: Asset Classes and Average Service Lives  
Average Service Life (Years) 
Asset Class 
Private Sector  Public Sector 
Construction  50   50 
Machinery and Equipment   ...  15 
Imported Capital Goods  15  ... 
Domestically Produced Capital 
Goods 
10   ... 
Cultivated Assets and Major 
Improvements to Land 
6  ... 
Other Assets  10  ... 
Source: Based on OECD (2001b) and expert consultation. 
4.4 Quality Indices of Capital and Labor 
Based on the previous calculations, quality indices can be elaborated. The quality 
index of the labor force will only be used in the later growth accounting exercise 
since it already reflects improvements in human capital. However, the estimate for 
the quality of capital enters into the regressions. The following paragraphs are 
concerned with the construction of the indices for the quality of capital and labor, 
respectively, and a brief comparison over both indices for 1970-2002. The capital and 
labor quality indices yield interesting outcomes. 
Quality of Capital  
One can calculate a quality index of capital by using the disaggregated capital stock 
data. The estimate follows the methodology advocated by Laurits et al. (1980) and -26- 
Roldós (1997). For the case of Guatemala, this means that changes in the index of 
quality of capital, zq, are computed as a weighted average of investment of the four 
broad asset groups. These are (1) public and private construction, (2) imported capital 
goods and investment in machinery and equipment, (3) domestically produced capital 
goods, and (4) cultivated assets and major improvements to land. The formula used 
is: 
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where Ki is the respective capital stock and the weights vi are the relative capital 
rental rates. The index reflects changes in the composition of capital. If  all 
components of the capital stock are growing at the same rate, quality remains 
unchanged. If components of the capital stock with higher capital rents are growing 
more rapidly, quality increases. Since data on the rental rates  vi is not readily 
available for Guatemala, estimates of these are, following Roldós (1997), based on 
the arbitrage relation: 
(13)  1 , , , , ) 1 ( ) 1 ( + ￿ - - ￿ + = t i i Z t i t t i P P r v d  
where Pi is a price index,  i Z , d  the depreciation rate, and rt is the economy-wide real 
interest rate. The price indices for the respective asset groups are taken from the 
Morán and Valle (2002) database. In order to take into account the volatility of the 
real exchange rate, which affects directly the relative price of the four types of 
capital, and to correct for measurement bias, the final series are smoothed by a 3-year 
moving average. 
Quality of Labor  
To quantify labor quality, an index hq is computed as a weighted average of labor 
within different levels of education. This formulation is consistent with the growth 
accounting literature that makes adjustments for education. It allows a more accurate 
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where Lj is the labor force with education level j (primary, secondary and tertiary) 
and wj are the weights for the respective schooling level. The weights measure how 
the productivity effect of schooling varies with the level of education and are taken 
from the later regression analysis (Table 6). Interestingly, they correspond 
approximately with the private r eturns to schooling at each education level, as 
presented by Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (2002) for Guatemala. 
Following OECD (2001a) another possibility to compute an implicit labor quality 
index would be to assume direct relations between skills and occupations, to rank -27- 
occupations by their skill intensity and then use information on the occupational 
distribution of labor over time. In this case, skilled labor and less skilled labor have to 
be weighted by their respective relative labor productivity to account for differences 
in skills. For the case of Guatemala, similar to equation (14), this can be done by 
weighting labor inputs of different industries with the share that each type of labor 
occupies in total labor compensation. 
However, it should be kept in mind that this kind of implicit differentiation of labor is 
a rather incomplete substitute for labor quality. It can only take into account some of 
the quality changes of labor input and does not allow the sources of the change to be 
identified. Moreover, the eight industry categories available from  Banco de 
Guatemala (2003) statistics only apply to the formal sector. As such, they ignore 
approximately 75 percent of the population working in the informal and rural 
economy. Placing less emphasis on educational improvements in  primary 
schooling—the working population of the IGSS is typically better educated than the 
population in the informal and rural sectors—the implicit labor quality index is biased 
downwards.
19 
Figure 4. Guatemala: Comparison of Labor Quality Indices, 1970-2002 (in 
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Source: Author’s calculations based on Banco de Guatemala (2003) data (implicit labor quality index), and 
human capital stock estimate for labor quality index (hq). 
                                         
19   This is because primary school enrollment has increased substantially over time (see Table 3). -28- 
Nevertheless, for illustrative purposes, Figure 4 compares both indices. What is 
striking is the apparent similarity between both measures of labor quality despite 
completely different sources of data. This suggests that the time series properties of 
the human capital stock and its respective weights may be of reasonable quality. 
Comparison of Both Indices  
Finally, Figure 5 compares the estimated indices of the quality of labor, hq, and 
capital, zq. The descriptive analysis yields three important outcomes. First, the index 
of labor quality presents a clear upward trend, reflecting improvements in educational 
capital and a shift to more skilled jobs. However, as a consequence of the civil strife, 
labor quality slightly declined during the early 1990s but begins to increase again 
after 1998. 
Second, the quality of capital has decreased over time. In particular after 1977, the 
data suggests that capital quality declined dramatically. In the mid 1990s, the advent 
of the Peace Accords led to an improvement, followed, however, by a stagnant 
pattern. In any case, for the period under observation, the quality of Guatemala’s 
capital stock declined by about 20 percent. The exact reasons underlying the 
deterioration are unclear and require further research. Prominent explanations are the 
destructive impact of the internal military conflict, and a negative investment climate 
due to an unstable policy environment and lack of good governance. 
Figure 5. Guatemala: Indices of Capital and Labor Quality, 1970-2002 (in 
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Source: Author’s calculations. a/ Changes in capital quality reflect the fact that investment with comparatively 
higher rental rates (imported capital goods as well as machinery and equipment) decreased during the civil war but 
eventually climbed up again. -29- 
Third, a comparison of both indices shows an apparent gap between the evolution of 
the quality of capital and the quality of labor. This could imply that the deterioration 
of quality of capital  is associated with, among other factors, the decreased output 
growth during the last decades. In other words, there is a missing complementarity 
between the country’s skills and its technology base. The next section will take a 
closer look at the empirical determinants of growth in Guatemala. 
 
5. Empirical Evidence for Guatemala 
This section presents the main empirical evidence regarding the relationship between 
education and growth in Guatemala. Section  5.1 introduces the empirical 
methodology. Section  5.2 reports the findings for average years of schooling and 
growth. Given the apparent shortcoming of aggregate measurements of human 
capital, section 5.3 examines separately the effects of primary, secondary and tertiary 
schooling on growth. Finally, section 5.4 compares the returns to education at the 
macro level with the microeconomic evidence. 
5.1 Methodology 
The empirical methodology for the following sections is based on the human capital 
augmented growth model of Mankiw et al. (1992). This model considers h uman 
capital as an independent factor of production. It can be represented in a Cobb-
Douglas production function with constant returns to scale: 
(15)  
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where  Y represents output and  A is the level of technology or total factor 
productivity.
20  K,  H and  L are physical capital, human capital and labor. 
Multicollinearity between capital and labor is avoided by standardizing output and 
the capital stock by labor units, which also impose the restriction that the scale 
elasticity of the production factors is equal to unity.
 Converted into a logarithmic 
expression, the production function can be estimated in its structural form: 
(16)   t t t t t u h k A y + ￿ + ￿ + = log log log log b a  
where the lower case variables y = Y/L and k = K/L are output and physical capital in 
intensive terms, and h = H/L stands for average human capital. At first glance, the 
                                         
20   Further research may focus on a specification less restrictive than a standard Cobb-Douglas 
production function to allow a higher degree of precision for the determination of the technical 
coefficients. For example, factor shares are not necessarily constant, and the elasticity of 
substitution can be less than 1. A potentially interesting avenue is Jones (2004). He presents a 
production function that exhibits a short-run elasticity of substitution between capital and labor 
that is less than 1, and a long-run elasticity that equals to 1. -30- 
formula already appears suitable for estimation. However, some problems arise since 
it is well known that most macroeconomic time series contain unit roots and that the 
regression of one non-stationary series on another is likely to yield spurious results. 
As reported in the Appendix, the data for Guatemala is no exception. The estimation 
bias can be removed by transforming the time series to stationarity. This can be done 
by first differencing. In any case, this will create its own problems, notably because 
of the risk of losing valuable information on the long-run relationships of the 
variables. 
One approach to dealing with this dilemma is to employ an error-correction model 
which combines long-run information with a short-run adjustment mechanism. This 
methodology has been used successfully in alternative growth studies. Examples of 
this are Nehru and Dareshwar (1994), Morales (1998), and Bassanini and Scarpetta 
(2001). The error-correction model can be estimated in different ways. Banerjee et al. 
(1993) show that the generalized one-step error-correction model is a transformation 
of an autoregressive distributed lag model. As such, it can be used to estimate 
relationships among non-stationary processes. Based on Hendry’s (1995) concept of 
general-to-specific modeling, the error-correction model of the human capital 
augmented production function for Guatemala can be specified as follows: 
(17)  1 2 1 log log log - D ￿ + D ￿ = D t t t k k y g g  
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For Guatemala, in line with much empirical cross-country research, the short-run 
effects of schooling on growth have been found insignificant and are as such 
excluded from the regressions. This suggests that only the level of human capital has 
a long-run effect on economic growth. As it stands, the equation can be estimated by 
ordinary least squares (OLS) or instrumental variables (IV) techniques, but the 
coefficients cannot be formed without knowledge of a and b. However, one can 
estimate the re-parameterized form: 
(18)  1 2 1 log log log - D ￿ + D ￿ + = D t t t k k c y g g            
      t j t j j t t t u dummy h k y + ￿ + ￿ + ￿ + ￿ + ￿ - - - , 1 5 1 4 1 3 log log log d g g g  
Estimates of the parameter g3 can now be used to calculate the required elasticities a 
and b. The loading coefficient g3 contains additional information because it can be 
interpreted as a measure of the speed of adjustment in which the system moves 
towards its equilibrium on the average. In addition, Banerjee et al. (1998) argue that 
in a single equation framework  a significant coefficient serves as a test for 
cointegration. Notice that the technology parameter, A, is allowed to change overtime 
as a function of different variables, Z: 
(19)   ) ( log t t Z f A =  -31- 
where in its simplest formulation the technology level is proxied by a constant term, 
c, and a series of dummy variables. In a later section, proxy variables with respect to 
growth of trade openness, bad governance, time trends and other variables will be 
included in the equation. The majority of the following regressions include three 
dummies. First, a 1963 impulse dummy captures a positive one-off effect stemming 
from expectations regarding the Central American Common Market (MCCA). 
Second, a 1982 impulse dummy takes into account a negative  one-off effect 
stemming from the peak of internal war. Third, a 1977 step dummy which models a 
structural change in the long-run relationship of the variables. A Chow breakpoint 
test does not reject the null hypothesis of no structural change during that year (p = 
0.000).  
In fact, the 1977 dummy is always negative, very significant, and most likely corrects 
for the deviations resulting from the civil strife. Interestingly, this finding is 
consistent with the quality index of the capital stock series showing a decreasing 
trend since 1977.
 21 
5.2 Average Years of Schooling and Growth 
Table 5 shows the results for the average years of schooling specification. The 
adjusted R
2 of the error-correction model is rather high and indicates a good data fit. 
Test statistics do not indicate any serial correlation or misspecification at 
conventional levels. The residuals have been found to be normally distributed and to 
follow stationary patterns. If not mentioned otherwise, these properties apply equally 
to subsequent regressions. The loading coefficient is highly significant and suggests a 
moderate speed of adjustment towards the long-run growth path, equal to about 25 
percent of the deviations per year. After any specific shock to the economy it would, 
on the average, take approximately 10 years to reach the level of output consistent 
with long-run growth (with differences to be less than 10 percent). In the subsequent 
regressions, however, the magnitude of the coefficient?but not its significance?was 
found to be fragile with respect to the econometric specification. The asymptotic 
critical values of the t-ratio for the coefficient are taken from Banerjee et al. (1998). 
The significance level suggests a cointegrating relationship of the variables.
22  
                                         
21   Evidently, the Guatemalan time series are full of distortions, for example the 1976 earthquake 
and major political events. However, a sparse inclusion of dummy variables is the preferred 
econometric formulation. Other settings will be described in the following sections. It is 
important to emphasize that the basic results are not sensitive to the dummy variables. That is, 
the omission of the impulse dummies (1963 and 1982) does have little impact on the qualitative 
results. However, it is important to model the structural break. 
 
22   Notice equally that the human capital parameters are highly significant and compare favorably 
with the critical values provided by Pesaran et al. (2001). This is reassuring given the small 
sample size of 50 observations and the consequently low power of the ADF tests, where the 
stationarity properties of the repressors may not be known with certainty. -32- 
Table 5. Production Function for Guatemala: Average Years of Schooling 
Specification, 1951-2002 
  Dependent variable: Percent change of GDP/worker 
  OLS      IV 
a/ 
Explanatory variables  (1)  (2) 
Constant  -0.077**                   
(-4.74) 
-0.077**                        
(-3.76) 
Percent change of capital/worker   0.871**             
(30.2) 
 0.774**           
(5.74) 
Percent change of capital/worker [-1]   0.120**             
(3.28) 
 0.169*              
(2.58) 
log GDP/worker [-1]
 b/  -0.241**                  
(-5.87) 
-0.269**                
(-5.28) 
log capital/worker [-1]    0.107**                 
(3.76) 
 0.099*            
(2.29) 
log average years of schooling [-1]   0.084**                
(5.00) 
 0.090**           
(4.54) 
Step dummy 1977  -0.041**                          
(-4.47) 
-0.039**                        
(-3.38) 
Impulse dummy 1963   0.057**                     
(4.69) 
 0.056**                  
(4.15) 
Impulse dummy 1982  -0.077**                  
(-4.88) 
-0.087**                
(-4.09) 
Long-run elasticity of capital   0.444   0.366 
Long-run elasticity of schooling   0.351   0.334 
Adjusted R
2   0.964   0.956 
F-statistic   170.5   40.67 
Durbin Watson 
c/   2.003   2.112 
S.E. of regression    0.012   0.013 
N  51   50 
a/ Lags of the independent variables are used as instruments. b/ Asymptotic critical values of the t-ratio are from 
Banerjee et al. (1998). c/ A Breusch-Godfrey test finds no evidence for the presence of first, second and third 
order correlation in the residuals. 
t-statistics in parenthesis. ** Significant at 1%, * significant at 5%. 
Source: Author’s calculations. -33- 
The results are satisfactory considering the distortions caused by the internal military 
conflict and the simplicity of the assumptions used to construct the time series in the 
context of data uncertainties. At first sight, this seems astonishing. However, the good 
performance of the model may be due to the small size of the economy, and that the 
overall data uncertainties are not as severe as is commonly believed.  
The most striking result is that human capital, as measured by average years of 
schooling, has a highly significant, positive and strong impact on long-run growth. 
Column 1 reports the implicit long-run coefficients estimated by OLS.
23 Since 
education levels are likely to respond to growing employment opportunities and 
increased income, column 2 shows the regression results when IV techniques are 
applied. In this case, lags of the explanatory variables are used as instruments. 
Compared to the OLS estimate, the quality of the results does not vary much with the 
IV estimation. The estimating parameters are in both cases significantly different 
from zero and the regressions, as test statistics indicate, show a satisfactory 
performance. However, the absolute value of the human capital coefficient is slightly 
reduced.  
By contrast, the implicit elasticity of the capital coefficient is sharply reduced. The 
endogeneity problem, thus, does not distort the estimate but has an impact on the 
magnitude of the coefficients. In the IV specification, the estimated long-run effect of 
a 1 percent increase of average schooling on GDP per unit of labor is 0.33 percent. As 
such, it is roughly consistent with a priori expectations on the magnitude of the factor 
share of human capital. The results in terms of the human capital augmented Cobb-
Douglas production function are approximately as follows: 
(20)  
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where the reported parameter values will serve as the base in a later growth 
accounting exercise. Notice that despite different methodologies the capital elasticity 
is broadly in line with empirical analyses which estimate a Cobb-Douglas production 
function for Guatemala (see Box 3). The capital elasticity, however, was found to be 
sensitive regarding the setting of the dummy variables. By contrast, the human capital 
coefficient was robust. These issues will be explored in more detail in the following 
analyses. 
Finally, there are two additional findings of interest. First, even in the IV estimate, 
physical capital accumulation h as a rather high impact on short-run growth. This 
suggests that measures to stimulate investment, for example by improving the 
investment climate, are likely to have an immediate impact on short-run growth. 
                                         
23   The long-run coefficients can be obtained by dividing the estimated parameter through the 
value of the loading coefficient, for example 0.084/0.241˜0.351. Discrepancies are due to 
rounding. -34- 
Second, the interception is significantly negative. Since the constant is expected to 
proxy for technology, a negative parameter in the sense of ‘technological regress’ is 
hard to understand. However, a loose interpretation for this finding would be that 
during the past 50 years, on average, the economy was not particularly efficient. One 
reason f or that might be the conflictive political and social environment of 
Guatemala. 
Box 3. Empirical Growth Studies for Guatemala: A Review 
There are no studies for Guatemala that empirically assess the direct impact of education on economic growth 
over time. However, some standard growth accounting regressions exist that partially confirm the findings of the 
present study. 
Prera (1999) and the World Bank (1996) came up with rough capital share estimates of about 0.4 and 0.6, 
respectively, while estimating a Cobb-Douglas production function. The World Bank provides neither a detailed 
methodology nor its data sources. The study from Prera faces several constraints regarding these issues. 
Particularly the fact that he ignores the existence of unit roots within the time series context and the low 
significance of the estimated parameters places doubt on the reliability of the results. Morán and Valle (2002) face 
the same problems. In addition, their parameter estimates must be considered carefully because of a short time 
period. The capital share is estimated about 0.3. Segovia and Lardé (2002) find a similar capital share using a first 
differences specification. Although the methodologies and data sources differ, the results partially suggest that the 
capital share for Guatemala is in agreement with empirical studies for other developing countries. According to 
Bosworth et al. (1996), capital shares are typically considered to be in the order of 0.3-0.4. 
Some growth accounting studies for Guatemala also exist. Results differ and no firm conclusions can be drawn. 
The main discrepancies stem from the assumed or estimated factor shares, distinct time periods and, in particular, 
from data issues. Most studies rely on international data sets. They make no adjustments for the quality of inputs 
and are not concerned too much about data problems in the light of the civil strife. In general, studies tend to find 
that the role of total factor productivity growth was moderate and decreasing for recent periods. (with the 
exception of Bailén 2001, see for example Bosworth et al. 1996, Edwards 2000, Gregorio 1992, Loayza et al. 
2002, Morán and Valle 2002, Nehru and Dhareshwar 1994, Segovia and Lardé 2002, Prera 1999, and World Bank 
1996). 
Particularly interesting is the work of Sakellariou (1995) who claims to use the Lucas (1988) model of 
endogenous growth. While analyzing microdata from the 1989 household survey, Sakellariou tests external effects 
of education on wage differentials. Unfortunately, the study suffers from a limited number of industry categories 
and human capital variables. Consequently, the regressions turn out to be statistically insignificant and strong 
conclusions cannot be drawn. However, Sakellariou  goes as far as finding that the analysis does not reject the 
hypothesis that external effects of human capital investment could be present in Guatemala. 
 
5.3 Schooling and Growth by Education Level 
Using education data by levels may be preferable for a number of reasons. In 
particular, the growth impact of different forms of educational capital may vary. 
Columns 1-6 in Table 6 present the results of the production function augmented for 
human capital. The education level of the labor force enters separately into the 
estimation. The share of the labor force with primary, secondary and tertiary 
education is used here as the relevant unit. It may be argued that average years of 
schooling by level of education should be used instead of labor force participation. In 
any case, with the given data, this would not change the results. Ideally, one would -35- 
also include primary, secondary and tertiary education into the same equation in order 
to assess their joint impact on growth. However, due to strong collinearity, the 
estimation only supports the inclusion of one education level.
24 As can be appreciated 
from the test statistics the regressions perform quite well. Notice that the estimate for 
primary education includes a time trend starting in 1985, the year of Guatemala’s 
transition to civilian rule. The inclusion of the trend variable was motivated to avoid 
serial correlation in the residuals, but does not have an impact on the magnitude of 
coefficients.  
Table 6 presents both OLS and IV estimates. The endogeneity problem seems to be 
more pronounced for primary education, and in particular for physical capital. 
However, the qualitative results do not vary substantially. In all specifications the 
schooling variables are highly significant and positively correlated with growth. 
Interestingly, the significance levels increase with secondary and tertiary education. 
Regarding the long-run elasticities, the accumulation of primary schooling appears to 
be most important for growth, followed by secondary and tertiary education. This 
finding should not be interpreted as implying that other levels are unimportant. This 
is particularly true given the tight connections between the various forms of 
educational capital and the retrospective character of the empirics. Nevertheless, the 
evidence is in line with the limited cross-country studies on this topic. Recall that 
Gemmel (1996), Petrakis and Stamatakis (2002) and Papageorgiou (2003) plausibly 
suggest that the importance of post-primary education increases with the level of 
development. Similarly, de Ferranti et al. (2002) argue that in countries classified as 
adopters, such as Guatemala, policies should first focus on a critical threshold level of 
primary schooling, coupled with open trade policies. The intuition is here that 
different s tages of technological transition require distinct policy priorities. A 
sufficient coverage and quality of primary education are regarded as the minimum 
prerequisite to adopt technologies. By contrast, in countries where basic skill 
requirements are fulfilled and firms are making significant adaptations or 
innovations, the creation of more specialized skills ought to be the priority. In 
addition, the results here partially confirm the earlier micro-level evidence for 
Guatemala.
25 
                                         
24   In principle, the inclusion of a time trend for 1999 and an interaction term for secondary and 
tertiary schooling would allow incorporating all three levels of education at a time. Tentatively, 
such an exercise yields similar qualitative results on the impact of each level of education on 
growth—albeit primary schooling becomes insignificant. In addition, due to the 
multicollinearity problem, this specification was found to be rather sensitive and performs less 
well than the results displayed in Table 6. 
 
25   For Guatemala, Psacharopoulos and others have extensively investigated the returns to 
schooling, sometimes by level of education. Such exercises are summarized in Psacharopoulos 
and Patrinos (2002), Haeussler (1993) and World Bank (1995). The studies generally report 
high private returns to primary schooling, but are merely based on ENS (1989) or earlier data, 
and typically do not care about sample selection bias. -36- 
Table 6. Guatemala: Effect of Schooling on Growth by Level of Education, 1951-2002 
  Dependent variable: Percent change of GDP/worker 
  j = primary     j = secondary     j = tertiary  
  OLS   IV    OLS  IV    OLS  IV 
Explanatory variables    (1)    (2)      (3)    (4)    (5)    (6) 
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Long-run elasticity of capital   0.445   0.333     0.426   0.319   0.538   0.474 
Long-run elasticity of schooling in education 
level j 
 0.426   0.349     0.230   0.220   0.104   0.101 
Adjusted R
2   0.962   0.953     0.962   0.948   0.960   0.962 
F-statistic   141.8   35.85     159.9   33.56   152.6   49.02 
Durbin Watson 
b/   1.756   1.978     1.944   2.055   1.790   2.205 
S.E. of regression    0.012   0.014     0.012   0.014   0.012   0.012 
N   51   50     51   50   51   50 
Note: The regressions include a 1977 step dummy and impulse dummies for 1963 and 1982, significant at 1%. a/ Asymptotic critical values of the t-ratio are from 
Banerjee et al. (1998). b/ A Breusch-Godfrey test finds no evidence for the presence of first, second and third order correlation in the residuals. 
t-statistics in parenthesis. ** Significant at 1%, * significant at 5%. 
Source: Author’s calculations. -37- 
Finally, it is interesting to observe the changes of the physical capital coefficients by 
level of education. In the IV specification for primary and secondary schooling, 
capital only enters as weakly significant. By contrast, the coefficient for physical 
capital becomes very significant and alters its long-run elasticity if tertiary education 
is entered into the estimate.  
To the extent that this effect does not merely reflect statistical arbitrariness, a possible 
interpretation would be that the productivity of physical capital is affected by tertiary 
schooling. These findings support the conjecture of Romer (1990b) that the level of 
scientific education should be correlated with the rate of growth and the share of 
output devoted to investment in physical capital. It should be kept in mind, however, 
that the reliability of tertiary education data is comparatively poor in Guatemala. 
Moreover, according to Anderson (2001), low quality and internal inefficiency plague 
university education. Hence, some care should be taken before drawing too strong 
conclusions from the observed changes. 
5.4 Mincerian Human Capital Specification 
An important question is how the effect of schooling at the macro level compares 
with the microeconomic evidence. The macro returns could be higher because of 
externalities from education. For example, if post-primary schooling leads to 
technological progress that is not captured in the private returns to education, or if 
education produces externalities in the form of the reduction of crime, more informed 
political decisions, better health and so on. To reconcile the macro effect of schooling 
with the micro level, Cohen and Soto (2001) estimate the following production 
function: 
(21) 
) 1 ( a a - ￿ ￿ = t t t t HM K A Y  
where  Y is output, A total factor productivity, K physical capital, and HM human 
capital. As first suggested by Bils and Klenow (2000), the micro evidence derived 
from a log-linear Mincer (1974) formulation can be used to specify the aggregate 
human capital stock as follows: 
(22)  t
h
t L e HM
t ￿ =





where hmt is the human capital per worker, ht is average years of schooling and y  
corresponds to the returns to education. This Mincerian approach has become popular 
in the literature since the work of Bils and Klenow.
26 The specification is a 
straightforward way of incorporating human capital into the production function in a 
                                         
26   The working paper version was circulated prior to 2000. A caveat here is the missing role of 
experience. -38- 
manner that is consistent with the standard semi-logarithmic formulation for 
estimating returns to schooling at the micro level.  
Nevertheless, Temple (2001) argues that the parameter y  may not be interpreted as 
the social returns to schooling because it does not incorporate the opportunity costs of 
the resources used in educational provision. Still, it remains of considerable interest 
since an empirical estimate provides a way of either confirming or rejecting the 
importance of education suggested by micro studies.  
For the Guatemalan case, the econometric specification is similar to the previous 
equations. The production function is first converted into a logarithmic expression:  
(23)  t t t t h k A y ￿ ￿ - + ￿ + = y a a ) 1 ( log log log  
Then, the production function is transformed into an error-correction formulation, 
which allows the long-run schooling parameter to be identified: 
(24)  1 2 1 log log log - D ￿ + D ￿ = D t t t k k y g g  
t t t t t u A h k y + - ￿ ￿ - - ￿ - ￿ - - - - - ) log ) 1 ( log (log 1 1 1 1 3 y a a g  
Finally, the error-correction model is re-parameterized and includes a series of 
dummy variables: 
(25)  1 2 1 log log log - D ￿ + D ￿ + = D t t t k k c y g g            
      t j t j j t t t u dummy h k y + ￿ + ￿ + ￿ + ￿ + ￿ - - - , 1 5 1 4 1 3 log log d g g g  
Notice that the implicit return to schooling can be calculated with knowledge of  a  
and  3 g . In principle, this approach would also allow the productivity effect of 
schooling to be differentiated by education level, as mentioned by Wößmann (2003). 
Unfortunately, the results here were found unstable for disaggregated education data. 
This is presumably due to the missing logarithmic transformation of the schooling 
variables.  
Insofar, the specification provides an attractive way for comparing macro and micro 
evidence on the returns to schooling, but in a time series context tends to produce 
fragile parameter estimates. Nevertheless, when using aggregated data on human 
capital the regressions perform quite satisfactorily. Table 7 presents the results. 
Controlling for endogeneity does not distort the empirics. In the IV specification 1 -39- 
Table 7. Production Function for Guatemala: Mincerian Human Capital 
Specification, 1951-2002 
  Dependent variable: Percent change of GDP/worker 
  OLS    IV
 a/ 
Explanatory variables  (1)  (2) 
Constant  -0.068**                          
(-4.28) 
-0.072**                 
(-3.78) 
Percent change of capital/worker   0.865**                              
(28.7) 
 0.752**                      
(6.05) 





 b/  -0.200**      
(-5.35) 
-0.240**                 
(-4.94) 
log capital/worker [-1]    0.069* 
(2.56) 
 0.058               
(1.45) 




Step dummy 1977  -0.035**  
(-3.97) 
-0.035**                
(-3.40) 




Impulse dummy 1982  -0.070**  
(-4.24) 
-0.080**               
(-3.85) 
Long-run elasticity of capital   0.343   0.240 
Effect of 1 additional year of average schooling   0.219   0.184 
Adjusted R
2   0.962   0.953 
F-statistic   159.2   41.08 
Durbin Watson 
c/   1.858   2.133 
S.E. of regression    0.012   0.014 
N   51   50 
a/ Lags of the independent variables are used as instruments. b/ Asymptotic critical values of the t-ratio are from 
Banerjee et al. (1998). c/ A Breusch-Godfrey test finds no evidence for the presence of first, second and third order 
correlation in the residuals. 
t-statistics in parenthesis. ** Significant at 1%, * significant at 5%. 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
 -40- 
additional year of schooling increases income per worker by approximately 18.4 
percent.
27 This number suggests that the macro return to schooling in Guatemala is 
rather high, but it compares favorably with earlier microeconomic evidence. For 
example, the World Bank (1995) reports a private return to schooling of 14.9 percent 
for Guatemala.
28 There is evidence for much lower returns in the informal sectors and 
for decreasing patterns over time, but the magnitude of the coefficient is echoed in 
Funkhouser (1997). An estimate from Haeussler (1993) based on 1989 survey and 
Ministry of Education data suggests that, depending on the schooling level and 
underlying assumptions, the social return to schooling lies in a band between 13-19 
percent. Finally, these results also confirm the cross-country evidence from Cohen 
and Soto (2001). They essentially find that in macro and micro regressions the effect 
of education on income is of similar magnitude. 
 
6. Robustness Check and Additional Explanatory Variables  
This section seeks to answer some basic questions. How much confidence should be 
placed on the previous results? Evidently, given certain data restrictions and 
distortions caused by the civil war, a key issue is if the previous findings can be used 
to derive firm policy conclusions. In addition, another important aspect is considered: 
does the conditioning information set cause the schooling coefficients to change?  
In order to answer these questions, the following paragraphs are organized as follows. 
Section  6.1 tests the stability of the variables. By comparing the results with 
alternative sources, section 6.2 includes time trends, and analyzes the reliability of the 
human and physical capital stock data. Section 6.3, the bulk of the analysis, includes 
additional variables explaining growth. An overview of the alternative data is 
presented in Figure 7. Additional variables are the quality of capital, trade openness, 
terms of trade, and imported capital goods. This section also examines the effect of 
life expectancy as a companion indicator for human capital. In addition the role of 
military expenditures is analyzed, which, among others things, may serve as a proxy 
for bad governance in Guatemala. Section 6.4 closes with a brief summary of the 
findings. 
6.1 Stability of Coefficients  
Given the distortions of the economy by the civil strife and other events, it is 
imperative to evaluate the stability of the coefficients. For example, comparing data 
                                         
27   According to the Table, the implicit return to schooling can be calculated as follows: 
(0.034/0.240)/(1-0.240)˜0.184. Discrepancies are due to rounding. 
 
28   Based on ENCOVI (2000) survey data the World Bank (2003a) reports an overall rate of return 
of 6 percent. -41- 
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from different points of time could cause coefficients to show dramatic jumps. In this 
case, it would be almost impossible to interpret the magnitude and sign of the 
coefficients. In order to test for instability, this section evaluates parameter stability 
using recursive least squares. This allows a year-by-year comparison of the 
coefficients since ever larger subsets of the time series data are used in the regression.  
With reference to the production function augmented for human capital, Figure 6 
visualizes the recursive coefficients of the regression (Table 5) estimated by OLS. 
Also shown are the standard error bands around the coefficients. The coefficients do 
not display significant variations when more data is added to the equation. This is in 
particular true for the schooling parameter and indicates stability. In the light of 
permanent shocks to the Guatemalan economy, it is reassuring to note that the 
coefficient plots do not show significant jumps since the error-correction 
specification here is capable of digesting these disruptive events. Due to s pace 
limitations Figure 6 does not include the recursive coefficients for the 3 dummy 
variables, although they have been found to be equally stable. Parameter stability was 
found satisfactory as well using a Mincerian human capital specification (Table 7) or 
employing disaggregated data on educational attainment (Table 6). 
6.2 Alternative Data Sources 
The estimates in this study ultimately rely on constructed time series. Consequently it 
is possible to ask: May the earlier results be related to arbitrary improvements during 
the stage of data construction? In order to pre-empt any suggestions of data mining, 
in particular with reference to the human and physical capital stock, this section 
discusses the use of alternative data sources. The benchmark for the subsequent 
variations in the data is the production function augmented for human capital (see 
Table 5).  
The results of the sensitive tests are reported in Table 8. In general, the following 
regressions do not perform as well as the earlier estimates but still satisfactorily pass 
conventional tests. A Breusch-Godfrey serial correlation test suggests the possibility 
that the estimates (only in column 1 and 4) might present mild evidence (p<0.15) of 
first order serial correlation. Since the indication was weak and would make little 
impact, no correction for it was attempted. In addition, the nature of the following 
exercise does not necessitate absolute precision but rather enriches the earlier 
findings. The following results suggest in general that the findings are not sensitive to 
the conditioning data set but rather strengthen the final conclusions about the 
importance of human capital. 
Inclusion of Time Trends 
Column 1 of Table 8 presents the original estimate for average years of schooling 
(Table 5), and also includes two time trends in order to account for the possibility of 
missing explanatory variables. The inclusion of the trend variables was motivated by -43- 
Figure 7. Guatemala: Additional Explanatory Variables of Growth,              
1950-2002 
(a)  GDP and Capital Stock (5 percent depreciation), 
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Data sources: See Appendix. -44- 
a look at the residual plot of the earlier estimates. They show moderate variations 
during these time periods, in particular since 1999. 
The inclusion of the trend variables does not have a substantial impact on the 
significance level of the long-run elasticities, albeit the magnitude of the coefficients 
is moderately affected. While the schooling coefficient decreases minimally, the 
physical capital coefficient is augmented. The time trend for 1985 is significantly 
positive but there is a negative trend since 1999. Interestingly, both time periods are 
related to political events. 1985 is the transition year to civilian rule. 1999 is the 
election year of the Alfonso Portillo government, where compromised representatives 
of the former military nomenclature are suspected of wielding political power. 
To the extent that this association is correct, a loose interpretation would suggest that 
in Guatemala the strengthening (weakening) of civilian rule has a significant positive 
(negative) impact on long-run growth. While at first sight this interpretation appears 
plausible, however, it is obvious that other factors are important as well. Moreover, 
the growth-enhancing channel of democratic rights might be operating indirectly on 
some independent variables, such as educational attainment. This complicates the 
analysis. Hence, further research is needed to strengthen this hypothesis. 
Alternative Capital Stock Data  
Column 2 of Table 8 includes capital stock data with a 4 percent depreciation rate 
rather than the 5 percent thumb value assumed throughout this study. The data with 4 
percent depreciation is essentially identical to the Nehru and Dareshwar ( 1993) 
capital stock series, despite some minor discrepancies?when compared with data 
from Banco de Guatemala?on investment. Assuming 4 percent depreciation of the 
capital stock has little impact on the results, although in the IV specification the 
significance of the capital coefficient is weakened. This suggests that a 4 percent 
depreciation is rather on the low side. 
Column 3 includes the capital stock estimate built with disaggregated investment data 
originally constructed to compute the quality index for capital. This series is robustly 
correlated with growth. The long-run elasticities for physical and human capital are 
slightly higher than with the standard estimate of the capital stock. Due to the limited 
number of observations the regression could only be run by OLS. Thus, the 
coefficients are likely to be upwardly biased. Altogether, varying the assumptions 
about the depreciation rate moderately changes capital elasticities but does not 
change very much the role of human capital on growth. 
Alternative Schooling Data  
The most interesting sensitive test concerns the validity of the conclusions on the 
importance of human capital to growth. Column 4 uses interpolated education data 
from Barro and Lee (2001). Column 5 includes the interpolated time series  from 
Cohen and Soto (2001) into the regressions. In both estimates human capital, as 
measured by average years of schooling, is robustly correlated with growth.  -45- 
Table 8. Guatemala: Robustness of Results—Alternative Data Sources 
  Dependent variable: Percent change of GDP/worker 
  Includes time 
trends starting in 
1985 and 1999 
4 percent 
depreciation of            
capital stock 
Disaggregated     
capital stock             
estimate
 b/ 
Barro and Lee 
(2001) education                
data
 c/ 





instead of labor 
force data 
      IV    
1951-02 
    IV       
1951-02 
   OLS 
1971-02 
    IV      
1951-00 
   IV      
1961-02 
  OLS 
1951-02 
Explanatory variables     (1)     (2)     (3)     (4)     (5)     (6) 




-0.042*     
(-2.57) 
-0.073**       
(-4.31) 


































-0.279**       
(-5.45) 












 0.108*    
(2.10) 
-0.127*     
(-2.02) 












Trend 1985   0.002** 
(2.83) 
...  ...  ...  ...  ... 
Trend 1999  -0.008*      
(-2.50) 
...  -0.008**  
(-3.63) 
...  ...  ... 
Long-run elasticity of capital   0.436   0.322   0.541   0.288   0.399   N.A. 
Long-run elasticity of schooling   0.287   0.344   0.392   0.476   0.266   N.A. 
Adjusted R
2   0.972   0.958   0.982   0.955   0.975   0.648 
F-statistic   57.55   43.28   180.4   59.61   67.88   14.92 
Durbin Watson   2.440   2.162   2.174   2.441   2.151   1.879 
S.E. of regression    0.011   0.013   0.009   0.013   0.010   0.014 
N   50   50   31   49   40   51 
Note: The regressions include a step dummy for 1977 and impulse dummies for 1963 and 1982 significant at 1%. a/ Asymptotic critical values of the t-ratio are from 
Banerjee et al. (1998). b/ Includes 1976 and 1982 impulse dummies significant at 1%. c/ Data is interpolated. 
t-statistics in parenthesis. ** Significant at 1%, * significant at 5%. 
Source: Author’s calculations. -46- 
Table 9. Guatemala: Effect of Schooling on Growth by Level of Education Considering Quality of Capital and Trade 
Openness, 1971-2002 
  Dependent variable: Percent change of GDP/worker 
  j = primary    j = secondary    j = tertiary 
     OLS 
c/       OLS
 c/ d/     OLS
 c/     OLS
 c/ d/     OLS
 c/      OLS
 c/ e/ 
Explanatory variables      (1)     (2)       (3)     (4)     (5)     (6) 
Constant  -0.048
+       
(-1.93) 
-0.065**    
(-3.19) 





































 a/  -0.342**        
(-5.32) 
-0.266**    
(-7.48) 
  -0.322**       
(-5.37) 
-0.332**    
(-6.56) 
-0.694*      
(-4.89) 
-0.571**    
(-5.64) 












log participation of education levelj                                                 














Step dummy 1977  ...  ...    -0.034**    
(-2.88) 
-0.024*      
(-2.38) 
-0.049**    
(-3.92) 
-0.051**    
(-5.62) 




Step dummy 1986   0.026* 
(2.37) 
...    ...  ...  ...  ... 
Percent change of trade volume/GDP  ...  0.141** 
(4.20) 
  ...   0.117** 
(3.20) 
...   0.017 
(0.68) 
Long-run elasticity of capital   0.529   0.401     0.370   0.424   0.507   0.496 
Long-run elasticity of schooling in education 
levelj 
 0.274   0.614     0.233   0.188   0.103   0.098 
Adjusted R
2   0.972   0.982     0.970   0.980   0.976   0.988 
F-statistic   132.7   180.0     124.3   148.1   150.9   232.1 
Durbin Watson 
b/   2.023   2.007     2.028   1.787   1.961   1.979 
S.E. of regression    0.011   0.009     0.011   0.009   0.010   0.007 
N   31   31     31   31   31   31 
a/ Asymptotic critical values of the t-ratio are from Banerjee et al. (1998). b/ A Breusch-Godfrey test finds no evidence for the presence of first, second and third 
order correlation in the residuals. c/ Includes impulse dummies for 1976 and 1982 significant at 5%. d/ Includes 1986 impulse dummy significant at 1%. e/ Includes 
impulse dummies for 1975 and 1996 significant at 5%. 
t-statistics in parenthesis. ** Significant at 1%, * significant at 5%, 
+significant at 10%.                                        
Source: Author’s calculations. -47- 
In addition, the parameter estimate yields a long-run elasticity in the range of 0.29-
0.39. This magnitude is similar to the benchmark results obtained in the earlier 
estimate. Given the interpolated nature of these sources, a too strong interpretation of 
the associated changes makes little sense. Insofar, the sign and significance of the 
variables are more important than their magnitude. All in all, employing alternative 
data on human capital confirms the earlier conclusions about the importance of 
education on growth. 
Population Instead of Labor Force Estimate  
The regression in column 6 employs population data (15-64 years) instead of the 
labor force. Alternatively ILO labor force estimates could be used. The time series 
properties, however, are almost identical, and population statistics refer to a longer 
time period. In any case, the results are rather disappointing. That is, the significance 
of the coefficients and the overall fit of the model are poor. In order to ameliorate the 
estimate, the lag structure of the short-run capital coefficients was modified. 
Human capital still enters positively but is only weakly significant. A puzzling 
finding is that long-run capital accumulation has now a negative impact on growth, 
which is a counterintuitive and implausible result. Overall, given the absence of 
fluctuations and considering the civil war, Guatemalan population data seems to be a 
poor proxy for labor as well. 
6.3 Additional Explanatory Variables 
When the conditioning set of data in the regressions is modified, it is interesting to 
observe changes in the explanatory variables, such as schooling. For example, the 
production elasticities of human or physical capital could be larger than their factor 
shares because of presumed externalities. The benchmarks of the following analyzes 
are the results in section 5. When possible, the following paragraphs differentiate for 
the effect of primary, secondary and tertiary schooling. 
Quality-Adjustment Capital 
Column 2 of Table 10 shows an OLS estimate for the period 1971-2002 when the 
capital stock is adjusted for quality. For comparative purposes, column 1 presents the 
same regression but without such an adjustment. Following de Ferranti et al. (2002) 
the intuition behind this exercise is that embodied technological change could have a 
positive impact on the returns to education, in particular for post-primary schooling. 
However, in the case of Guatemala, the overall effect seems to be the opposite. An 
increase in the long-run elasticity for physical capital and a decrease of the 
importance of education on growth is found. 
To interpret this puzzling finding recall that the index of capital quality actually 
measures a decay by about 20 percent. In contrast, human capital and hence labor 
quality, have increased substantially over time. This may point in the direction of a -48- 
missing capital-skill complementarity in Guatemala, which would tend to reduce the 
returns to education. Interestingly, this effect impacts mainly on primary education. If 
one compares the respective elasticities of Table 6 (columns 1, 3 and 5) and Table 9 
(columns 1, 3 and 5) the econometric results suggest that introducing quality 
adjustments for capital have little effect on secondary and tertiary education. 
Nevertheless, given the limited sample size of only 31 observations a word of caution 
is required here. These findings should be strengthened by additional research. 
Trade Openness  
Growth is often thought to be enhanced by trade openness. Apart from comparative–
advantage arguments, it is argued that openness expands potential markets, facilitates 
the diffusion of technological innovations, improves managerial practices and 
promotes domestic competition, all of which increase efficiency. Considering the 
small size of the Guatemalan economy trade openness is of particular interest. For 
case of Latin America, Loayza et al. (2002) present evidence suggesting a significant 
relationship between trade openness and growth.  
Column 3 of Table 10 suggests that the growth rate of trade openness is positively 
and significantly related to Guatemalan GDP growth. By contrast, the elasticities for 
physical and average human capital do not show significant variations. This finding 
changes, however, if disaggregated data on educational attainment is entered into the 
estimate. Table 9 reveals that the inclusion of the growth rate of trade openness alters 
the coefficient for primary education, while secondary and tertiary schooling remain 
more or less unchanged (columns 2, 4 and 6). The parameters for post-primary 
schooling are of a similar magnitude as those in the earlier estimate which did not 
consider trade openness (Table 6, columns 1, 3 and 5). Interestingly, in both cases, 
the coefficients for post-primary schooling are of almost identical magnitude, which 
is also an indication of robustness. The fact that trade affects only primary education 
may suggest that, over the past decades, general education and basic technical skills 
have been the key determinants for the diffusion of technological innovations. Or, 
more generally, the people with primary education seem to benefit particularly from 
the effects of trade openness. 
Somewhat surprisingly, the econometric evidence reveals that trade openness, as 
measured by the trade volume over GDP, exhibits a short-run effect on growth. The 
long-run coefficient was found insignificant and as such excluded from the model. A 
possible interpretation of this finding points in the direction of Rodríguez and Rodrik 
(2000). They cast doubt on the robustness with respect to measurement concepts and 
specifications of the bulk of the empirical evidence on this topic. Instead, they 
suggest exploring alternative causal interpretations. For example, an additional 
indirect channel might be that more-open economies adopt better policies and 
institutions that explain part of the effects of openness on growth. Following this 
interpretation, hitherto, trade openness in Guatemala has not been associated with 
political change (see also Box 1). -49- 
Column 3 indicates that improvement in the terms of trade, that is, a higher growth of 
the ratio of export prices to import prices, seem to enhance short-run economic 
growth. In line with the effect of trade openness, the long-run coefficient was found 
insignificant. However, the positive impact of terms of trade growth must be regarded 
with some caution. This is e ssentially because its significance was found fragile 
considering the conditioning set of variables that enter into the regression. 
Foreign Capital Goods  
International trade may have an additional impact on growth through the imports of 
foreign capital goods. Lee (1995) emphasizes that developing countries can increase 
the efficiency of capital accumulation and thereby the rate of growth by importing 
relatively cheap foreign capital goods from higher income countries. Taking into 
account this potential avenue of trade on growth, the ratio of capital imports to total 
investment is used as a proxy variable for the efficiency of capital accumulation. The 
regression of column 4 in Table 10 indicates that the composition of investment is 
indeed an important determinant for long-run growth in Guatemala. The implied 
elasticity suggests that a 1 percent increase in the ratio of capital imports to total 
investment increases output by about 0.10 percent. This supports the idea of Lee that 
more use of imported capital goods increases the efficiency of capital accumulation. 
Therefore, any trade distortion that restricts the importation of capital goods damages 
the economy in the long run. Such distortions also include disincentives for trade, 
such as a climate that discourages investment. Thus, continuing political instability 
and a climate of violence dampens the prospective for growth not only for the 
present, but also for future. 
Notice that the inclusion of the variable alters the coefficients for capital 
accumulation but has little impact on the elasticity of average years of schooling. 
Unfortunately, measuring the impact of foreign capital goods on schooling by level of 
education was hampered by implausibly high, albeit positive, parameter estimates for 
schooling. Tentatively, such an exercise reveals an altering of the coefficients for 
primary education but has little impact on secondary and tertiary schooling. This 
clearly supports the earlier finding of the effect of trade openness on growth by level 
of education. 
Life Expectancy 
Given the incomplete nature of education to proxy for human capital, a look at the 
effect of the health status yields important insights. Column 5 includes life 
expectancy at birth into the regression. The schooling variable is removed due  to 
collinearity. The health variable is highly significant and has a very strong impact on 
long-run growth. The estimate suggests that a 1 percent increase in life expectancy 
would increase output by about 1.04 percent. Barro (2001) suggests that the variable 
has such a strong impact on growth because it may proxy for features other than 
health, such as social capital, better work habits and a higher level of skill. The 
elasticities could be biased due to the reliance on interpolated data sources. -50- 
Nevertheless, the results support the view that human capital policies in Guatemala 
should place a strong emphasis on the health status of the population. This finding is 
equally echoed by the World Bank (2003a) that places Guatemala among the worst 
performers in terms of health outcome in Latin America, and particular poor in child 
nutrition. 
Military Expenditures and Governance 
Given the strong influence of military rule in Guatemala’s recent history, it is finally 
imperative to discuss the role of military expenditure on growth.
29 This issue is 
particularly important since in the light of Guatemala’s low tax burden military 
expenditures will necessarily be met at the expense of other government services, 
such as education and health. Military spending shows the priority given to other 
fiscal functions by the government and serves as an indicator of the military’s power 
as a lobby. As such, Guatemalan military expenditures may also indicate political 
corruption and other aspects of bad government. 
However, a number of channels by which military spending can influence growth 
have been identified. According to Deger and Sen (1995), the defense sector can take 
skilled labor away from civilian production, but it can also train workers. It could 
crowd out resources for investment and impact negatively on the efficiency of 
resource allocation, but also provide positive externalities for the civilian sector, such 
as infrastructure development. It can stipulate civil strife, but also generate an 
increase in national security and strengthen property rights. Thus, the role of military 
expenditure is ambiguous and the direction of the overall effect remains an empirical 
question. 
Given the historical and political context of Guatemala, however, it is hard to believe 
that military expenditure plays a positive role on economic growth. According to the 
Commission for Historical Clarification (1999) an overwhelming number of violent 
actions during the civil war was attributed to members of the army. In addition, 
forced displacement and mandatory civil defense patrols (Patrullas de Autodefensa 
Civil?PACs) diverted a significant share of the economically active population from 
productive activities. Guatemalan defense spending reached its height during the peak 
of the civil war and declined in the advent of the peace process. They eventually 
began to rise again in 2000. Even without econometric analysis, a look at Figure 7e 
reveals that output growth is essentially opposite to the ratio of military expenditure 
to GDP. Moreover, the negative correlation of the share of foreign capital goods to 
investment suggests that a higher ratio of military expenditure to GDP is associated 
with a decrease in the efficiency of capital accumulation. When military
                                         
29   As a share of GDP, military expenditure in Guatemala is not excessively high, ranging from 0.7 
up to 2 percent. However, its share of government expenditures is quite significant. According 
to Scheetz (2000) it has varied from approximately 14 up to 31 percent (in the 1980s) in terms 
of total resources controlled by the Treasury. -51- 
Table 10. Guatemala: Additional Explanatory Variables to Growth 
Dependent variable: Percent change of GDP/worker 
  Without quality 




adjustment for   
capital 
 b/ 
Terms of trade and 
trade openness 
b/ 
Capital imports/      
investment




Military spending/    
GDP                         
  OLS 1971-02  OLS 1971-02  OLS 1951-02  IV 1951-02  IV 1961-00  IV 1951-02 
Explanatory variables     (1)     (2)     (3)     (4)     (5)     (6) 
Constant  -0.080**        
(-4.62) 
-0.120**      
(-3.66) 
-0.073**      
(-5.49) 
-0.070**      
(-3.69) 
-1.266**      
(-5.16) 
-0.215**      
(-3.85) 

























 a/  -0.230**      
(-5.40) 
-0.408**       
(-5.83) 
-0.227**      
(-6.76) 
-0.316**      
(-5.96) 
-0.307**       
(-5.34) 
-0.316**       
(-6.38) 




















...   0.102** 
(6.20) 
log life expectancy [-1]  ...  ...  ...  ...   0.316** 
(5.09) 
... 
log military expenditure/GDP [-1]  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  -0.024*        
(-2.42) 
Imported capital goods/investment [-1]  ...  ...  ...   0.032** 
(2.73) 
...  ... 
Percent change of trade volume/GDP   ...  ...   0.089** 
(3.57) 
...  ...  ... 
Percent change of terms of trade  ...  ...   0.037* 
(2.39) 
...  ...  ... 
Long-run elasticity of capital   0.306   0.409   0.420   0.653   0.439   0.501 
Long-run elasticity of schooling   0.458   0.365   0.378   0.289     N.A.   0.323 
Adjusted R
2   0.976   0.974   0.977   0.965   0.969   0.972 
F-statistic   158.2   140.3   191.7   45.82   61.45   57.49 
Durbin Watson
 e/   1.785   2.013   2.303   2.308   2.208   2.365 
S.E. of regression    0.010   0.011   0.009   0.012   0.011   0.010 
N   31   31   51   50   39   50 
Note: The regressions include a step dummy for 1977 and impulse dummies for 1963 and 1982 significant at 1%. a/ Asymptotic critical values of the t-ratio are from Banerjee et al. (1998). 
b/ Includes a 1976 impulse dummy significant at 1%. c/ Includes a time trend starting in 1999 significant at 5%. d/ Data is interpolated. e/ A Breusch-Godfrey test finds no evidence for the 
presence of serial correlation in the residuals. 
t-statistics in parenthesis. ** Significant at 1%, * significant at 5%.                                                                       
Source: Author’s calculations. -52- 
expenditures are included into the regression, column 6 of Table 10 reveals a 
significant negative impact on long-run growth. The implicit elasticity suggests that a 
1 percent increase in the defense burden decreases output by approximately 0.08 
percent. Considering the negative correlation with imported capital goods (r = –0.69) 
and the effects of the internal war, however, the true magnitude of military 
expenditures on long-run growth may be underestimated. 
6.4 Summing-Up 
For the case of Guatemala, sensitive tests reveal that the relationship of human capital 
and growth proves stable. Parameter stability of the coefficients is acceptable and 
employing alternative data in fact strengthens the findings. An important aspect is 
that the health status of the country exhibits a strong impact on long-run growth. In 
the light of Guatemala’s recent history, it does not come as a big surprise that military 
expenditure has hampered growth. One important point here is that it crowds out 
investment. By contrast, imported foreign capital goods exhibit a significant impact 
on long-run growth via an increase in the efficiency of capital accumulation. In 
agreement with the previous section, primary schooling has the strongest impact on 
productivity growth, and is particularly affected by adjustments for the quality of 
capital and the growth of trade openness. 
 
7. Sources of Growth 
The following paragraphs apply a modified growth-accounting framework to explore 
some basic facts of economic growth in Guatemala. Growth accounting can be very 
informative by providing a consistent decomposition of economic growth among its 
proximate sources. As such, growth accounting is a useful framework to explain a 
country’s growth experience and may provide a basis for medium-term 
recommendations. The section is divided into four parts. Section 7.1 briefly describes 
the methodological framework. To facilitate comparisons section  7.2 presents 
alternative measures of the sources of growth for Guatemala. After giving the results 
of a traditional Solow (1957) decomposition, indices for the quality of inputs are 
considered. Section  7.3 extends the basic growth accounting framework to 
disaggregate by l evel of education. Finally, section 7.4 compares the results with 
international evidence. 
7.1 Growth Accounting Framework 
Growth accounting is a technique that seeks to identify the sources of economic 
growth. The standard aggregate production function that generates the growth 
accounting equation is: 
(26) 
) 1 ( a a - ￿ ￿ = t t t t L K A Y  -53- 
where  Y,  K and  L represent output, physical capital stock and labor input, 
respectively. The term A is total factor productivity (TFP) and reflects the relative 
efficiency of the inputs to produce a given amount of output. The production function 
is assumed to have constant returns to scale and the markets are assumed to be 
competitive. In this framework, the growth rate of output can be represented as: 
(27)  
1 1 1 1
) 1 (
























a a  
where output growth is divided into components attributable to changes in the factors 
of production. TFP growth is a residual that represents the component of growth that 
is not explained by increases in the factors of production, but rather by productivity 
gains. The production function elasticities can give estimates of factor shares that are 
used to weigh the relative contribution of the inputs growth rates and to obtain 
straightforward estimates of the residual. Based on the r esults of the earlier 
regressions, the capital share, a , is taken to be equal to 
1/3. According to Bosworth et 
al. (1996) the econometric results are quite consistent with the evidence for other 
developing countries. Reliable estimates typically yield capital shares in the range of 
0.3-0.4. 
Estimates of Solow residuals are sensitive to the precision of the estimated factor 
shares, measurement errors, and adjustments for utilization and quality. For the case 
of Guatemala, as will be apparent in the next section, it is crucial to explicitly account 
for the quality of inputs.
30 Within the basic framework, changes in the quality of labor 
and physical capital are picked up in TFP. As such, TFP growth is overstated and the 
contribution of inputs is understated. In order to explicitly account for changes in the 
quality of inputs, the standard sources of growth equation is extended:  














































a a  
where zqt and hqt are quality indices of capital and labor, respectively. 
Another important consideration, not captured by the basic framework, is to account 
for the contribution by level of education. Barro (1998) describes extensions of the 
basic growth accounting framework to allow for disaggregation across different 
factor types. Incorporating primary, secondary and tertiary education into the 
production function augmented for human capital gives: 
                                         
30   Accounting for the degree of utilization of factor inputs is equally important. A common proxy 
is to use the unemployment rate. However, in the case of Guatemala with its extremely poor 
data on unemployment, such an adjustment is more likely to introduce measurement error than 
to correct for it. -54- 
























































b a b a  
where Hi indexes for primary, secondary and tertiary schooling. The capital share for 
physical capital is 
1/3. Likewise, the shares for human capital, i b , are taken from the 
earlier regression estimates disaggregated by level of education. To ensure 
comparability with the aggregate case, however, the coefficients are scaled so as to 
preserve the aggregate human capital share of approximately 
1/3. Consequently, the 
implicit shares for the aggregate case are 0.17 for primary, 0.11 for secondary and 
0.05 for tertiary schooling. 
Finally, before taking a look at the results, it is important to emphasize some 
methodological caveats of growth accounting. TFP reflects a whole range of factors 
since it captures everything that is not accounted for. It is hard to distinguish the 
effect of technological change from that of improved resource allocation, or from bias 
resulting from model deficiencies and poor data quality. Thus, TFP estimates may be 
affected by scale economies and can be sensitive to data perpetuation.  
In addition, findings in the area of growth accounting require careful interpretation 
because the technique does not provide information about the interdependencies of 
the variables. For instance, an increase of output growth could be due to a percentage 
change in educational attainment. This would not imply that, i n the absence of 
educational improvements, the growth rate would have been precisely the same 
percentage point lower. Quite the contrary, education could impact on output growth 
due to fertility, attitudes and labor force participation, investment and productivity. 
Therefore, growth accounting should be treated with caution and only be regarded as 
a useful technique for examining growth. 
7.2 Sources of Growth in Traditional Framework 
Table 11 presents a basic decomposition of GDP growth for Guatemala for 1951-
2002. TFP is measured as the residual representing the component of growth not 
explained by labor or capital accumulation. There are no adjustments for the quality 
of inputs. The results suggest that growth in Guatemala is largely due to the 
accumulation of inputs. Labor plays the dominant role in explaining about 50 percent 
of Guatemala’s growth rate of GDP, followed by the accumulation of capital with 
approximately 32 percent. Growth of TFP?unadjusted for the quality of inputs?was 
about 18 percent. 
Introducing quality change in factor inputs brings the relative roles of capital and 
labor into a sharper focus. Table 12 presents a decomposition of GDP growth for 
1971-2002. Average annual growth was about 3.5 percent, while it was 3.9 percent 
during the whole five decades. Compared to the basic growth accounting framework, 
the results change dramatically. In particular, quality-adjusted labor now explains 
about 78 percent of the growth rate of GDP, compared to 50 percent explained by the  -55- 
 
Table 11. Guatemala: Decomposition of GDP Growth                                         
in Basic Framework, 1951-2002 (in percent) 
a/ 
Contribution of  Time 
Period 
GDP Growth 
Rates  Capital  Labor  TFP 
1951-55  2.3  0.6  -2.3  4.0 
1956-60  5.4  1.7  4.0  -0.3 
1961-65  5.3  1.1  3.8  0.3 
1966-70  5.8  1.7  3.6  0.5 
1971-75  5.6  1.6  2.2  1.9 
1976-80  5.7  2.3  5.4  -2.0 
1981-85  -1.1  0.6  -2.0  0.2 
1986-90  2.9  0.4  3.1  -0.5 
1991-95  4.3  0.9  1.2  2.2 
1996-00  4.0  1.5  0.8  1.6 
2001-02  2.3  1.3  1.6  -0.7 
1.2  2.0  0.7 
Average  3.9 
32%  50%  18% 
Source: Author’s calculations. a/ Discrepancies are due to rounding. 
 
Table 12. Guatemala: Decomposition of GDP Growth                              
Adjusted for Quality of Inputs, 1971-2002 (in percent) 
a/ 
Contribution of  Time 
Period 
GDP Growth 
Rates  Capital  Labor  TFP 
1971-75  5.6  1.5  3.6  0.5 
1976-80  5.7  1.5  6.4  -2.1 
1981-85  -1.1  0.2  -0.7  -0.5 
1986-90  2.9  -0.1  3.5  -0.4 
1991-95  4.3  1.1  0.6  2.6 
1996-00  4.0  1.8  2.6  -0.4 
2001-02  2.3  1.1  3.4  -2.3 
1.0  2.7  -0.2 
Average  3.5 
28%  78%  -6% 
Source: Author’s calculations. a/ Discrepancies are due to rounding.-56- 
unadjusted labor variable. This finding unambiguously suggests that the effect of the 
increase of education, now captured by the labor quality index, was the main driving 
force behind TFP growth during the past decades.  
By contrast, quality-adjusted capital only explains about 28 percent of growth, 
compared to 32 percent explained by the unadjusted variable. Consistent with earlier 
findings, the decrease of capital accumulation in explaining GDP growth reflects the 
deterioration of the quality of the country’s physical capital base. This is most likely 
associated with the disastrous effect of the civil war and a negative investment 
climate, among other factors. The finding of a negative rate of TFP growth of about 6 
percent for the period 1971-2002 is a somewhat odd result. Rather than 
‘technological regress’ it should be interpreted as an indication of the declining 
efficiency of the economy, due to the conflicting political and social environment of 
the country. Notice that TFP growth is consistent with the earlier regression results. 
In most specifications the constant term was found to be significantly negative.  
How stable are these findings? The TFP estimate was found sufficiently robust. A 
sensitivity analysis based on alternative assumptions on the factor shares yielded TFP 
growth estimates ranging from –4 percent (capital share 0.4 and labor share 0.6) to –1 
percent (capital share 0.5 and labor share 0.5). The associated changes of the 
contribution of labor and capital was negligible. Applying alternative data sources to 
calculate the residual was not found to be helpful. The robustness tests of the 
regression analyses clearly indicate that both the labor (based on IGSS data) and 
capital variable (5 percent depreciation) provide a higher explanatory power than 
other sources. 
7.3 Disaggregation by Education Level 
Table 13 shows the results of the extended growth accounting exercise for the period 
1951-2002. The human capital variables now enter directly into the production 
function by level of education. They capture improvements in the country’s skill 
base, which were formerly measured by quality-adjusted labor. At first sight, the 
overall results are somewhat similar to the decomposition of GDP growth in the 
traditional framework. With about 32 percent explaining growth, the role of physical 
capital accumulation is moderate.  
At second sight, the contrast to the traditional framework is apparent. Table 13 
suggests that human resources are the main engine of growth. In fact, the human 
capital variables alone explain approximately 50 percent of output growth. Of these, 
the main contribution comes from secondary education with about 21 percent. This is 
closely followed by primary education, which explains about 19 percent of growth. 
The contribution of tertiary education was only 10 percent. 
Insofar, both primary and secondary schooling constitute major determinants of GDP 
growth. The fact that secondary education constitutes the dominant role reflects its 
rapid increase in the share of the economically active population. Approximately 20  -57- 
Table 13. Guatemala: Decomposition of GDP Growth with Education Level 
Disaggregation, 1951-2002 (in percent) 
a/ 
            Contribution of 




Rates  Capital  Labor 
Primary  Secondary  Tertiary 
TFP 
1951-55  2.3  0.6  -1.1  0.0  0.7  -1.1  3.2 
1956-60  5.4  1.7  2.0  1.3  1.1  1.1  -1.7 
1961-65  5.3  1.1  1.9  1.2  1.2  0.7  -0.8 
1966-70  5.8  1.7  1.8  1.4  0.8  0.7  -0.5 
1971-75  5.6  1.6  1.1  0.9  0.9  0.7  0.5 
1976-80  5.7  2.3  2.7  1.5  1.7  0.8  -3.4 
1981-85  -1.1  0.6  -1.0  -0.3  0.1  0.0  -0.6 
1986-90  2.9  0.4  1.5  0.8  0.8  0.6  -1.3 
1991-95  4.3  0.9  0.6  0.1  0.2  0.5  2.0 
1996-00  4.0  1.5  0.4  0.7  0.5  0.2  0.6 
2001-02  2.3  1.3  0.8  0.6  1.3  0.3  -2.1 
1.2  1.0  0.8  0.8  0.4  -0.3 
Average  3.9 
32%  25%  19%  21%  10%  -7% 
Source: Author’s calculations. a/ Discrepancies are due to rounding. 
Table 14. Guatemala: Decomposition of GDP Growth with Education Level 
Disaggregation and Adjusted for Quality of Capital, 1971-2002 (in percent) 
a/ 
            Contribution of 




Rates  Capital  Labor 
Primary  Secondary  Tertiary 
TFP 
1971-75  5.6  1.5  1.1  0.9  0.9  0.7  0.6 
1976-80  5.7  1.5  2.7  1.5  1.7  0.8  -2.5 
1981-85  -1.1  0.2  -1.0  -0.3  0.1  0.0  -0.2 
1986-90  2.9  -0.1  1.5  0.8  0.8  0.6  -0.7 
1991-95  4.3  1.1  0.6  0.1  0.2  0.5  1.8 
1996-00  4.0  1.8  0.4  0.7  0.5  0.2  0.4 
2001-02  2.3  1.1  0.8  0.6  1.3  0.3  -1.8 
1.0  0.9  0.6  0.7  0.5  -0.2 
Average  3.5 
28%  25%  18%  21%  14%  -6% 
Source: Author’s calculations. a/ Discrepancies are due to rounding. -58- 
percent of the labor force has had secondary schooling in 2000, compared to only 
about 2 percent in 1950. The increase of primary schooling in the labor over time was 
much slower. As evidenced on Table 3, during the past five decades it has essentially 
doubled. Finally, Table 14 presents a decomposition of GDP growth by level of 
education. Capital is here adjusted for quality. Notice that the quantitative results for 
the period 1971-2002 are almost identical to Table 12. Capital explains 28 percent of 
growth, compared to 78 percent explained by labor and education. Of these, 
secondary education plays the dominant role, followed by primary and tertiary 
education. Thus, the results of the different accounting exercise were found consistent 
over time. 
Figure 8. Guatemala: Evolution of Total Factor Productivity, 1951-2002 (annual 
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Source: Author’s calculations. 
Figure 8 plots the annual TFP growth rates for the period 1951-2002. It contains two 
measures of TFP. The dotted line indicates TFP growth adjusted for the quality of 
labor. The thin solid line presents TFP growth adjusted for the quality of capital and 
labor. Both lines show similar patterns. Productivity growth is volatile according to 
Figure 8. Also, it is apparently not free of measurement errors. For instance, the 
strong increase in 1981 is probably best interpreted by data deficiencies. Therefore, to 
facilitate the interpretation of the results, the bold trend line was included using the 
Hodrick-Prescott filter. Productivity growth has been positive, although slightly 
decreasing until the late 1950s. This was followed by a substantial deterioration from 
the early 1960 until the end of the 1980s. In the 1990s, TFP growth became positive -59- 
again, but from 1999 on has eventually decreased.
31 All in all, Figure 8 obviously 
suggests that TFP growth in Guatemala was closely associated with political events. 
7.4 Comparison of Results with International Evidence 
How do these estimates compare to other Latin American countries? The Appendix 
summarizes the results of a study that applies a comparable methodology. Loayza et 
al. (2002) focus on the growth performance of 20 Latin American and Caribbean 
countries. Similar to the approach used here, they adjust for changes in the quality of 
labor associated with increased educational attainment.
32 Consistent with 
international evidence, Loayza et al. find that during the 1990s the recovery in output 
growth for the ‘best’ performers in the Latin American region was driven by 
increases in their rates of TFP growth, and less so by factor accumulation.  
However, in most Central American countries TFP growth was only moderate. In 
some cases it was even negative. While TFP growth in Guatemala appears to be on 
the high side compared to its Central American neighbors, it is worth recalling that 
the estimate presented in the Appendix does not take into account quality changes of 
the physical capital stock. Given the decay of Guatemala’s quality-adjusted capital 
stock, TFP growth is likely to be overstated. In addition, a one-to-one comparison is 
hampered by the nature of the different data sources.
33 Overall, Guatemala’s growth 
experience shows some similarities with its neighbors, in particular with Costa Rica 
and El Salvador. During the 1990s these countries have experienced much faster 
growth than during the 1980s. In particular, quality-adjusted labor — associated with 
increased educational attainment — was the main source of growth. 
 
8. Conclusion 
Human capital has a highly significant and positive impact on long-run growth in 
Guatemala. The importance of human capital is substantial. An increase  by 1 
percentage point of average years of schooling would raise output by about 0.33 
percent. The effect is of similar magnitude to that in micro studies. A disaggregated 
analysis by level of education reveals that primary schooling is most important for 
productivity growth, followed by secondary schooling. Over the past decades, it 
appears that general education and basic technical skills have been the main 
                                         
31   This finding is in agreement with other recent growth accounting studies for Guatemala, which 
are presented in Box 3. 
 
32   Roldós (1997) examines the growth experience for Chile, and adjusts for changes in the quality 
of labor and capital. These results are in the Appendix. 
 
33   For example, Loayza et al. (2002) rely on the Barro and Lee (2001) data set on educational 
attainment. -60- 
determinants for the diffusion of technological innovations, and people with primary 
education have  particularly benefited from policies that promote competitiveness, 
such as trade openness. The stability of the error-correction model with respect to 
data issues and endogeneity concerns are the main reasons for confidence in the 
overall results. The robustness is even more remarkable in the context of heavy 
distortions within the Guatemalan economy. 
Accounting for the sources of growth supports the importance of human capital in 
Guatemala. Such an exercise reveals that the increased skill level has been the main 
driving force behind productivity growth, and that education explains more than 50 
percent of output growth during the past five decades. A differentiation by level of 
education suggests that the growth of secondary schooling was the predominant 
factor, closely followed by primary education. Tertiary education ranks last. Due to 
an environment of social and political conflict, however, total factor productivity has 
been slightly negative over the past decades. The evolution of productivity growth is 
linked to political events — such as the civil strife and military rule — and suggests a 
declining efficiency of the economy over time.  
The study contains additional findings of interest, which ultimately point towards the 
importance of an institutional and political environment conducive to growth. They 
can be summarized as follows: 
First, Guatemala’s growth process was accompanied by the exclusion of large parts 
of society from wealth and by underlying social conflict. The growth rates of the 
sectors that employ the poor and rural people lagged behind other sectors of the 
economy. Extreme social imbalances and weak institutions for conflict management 
gave rise to an internal military conflict that imposed high costs for long-run growth. 
Regarding Guatemala’s future growth prospects, a key factor for reducing the 
vulnerability of the economy to external shocks is to reduce inequality and to 
strengthen democratic institutions.  
Second, mean education of the labor force has increased over time, although it 
suffered from the civil strife. The attention to education since the Peace Accords has 
only compensated the loss of human capital caused by the civil war, but does not 
represent a major improvement regarding the long-run growth of human capital. This 
means that considerably more effort is needed to strengthen the country’s human 
capital base. The strong impact of life expectancy on growth suggests that human 
capital policies should not only focus on the expansion of the quantity as well as the 
quality of primary and secondary education, but in particular also place a great deal 
of emphasis on the health status of the population. 
Finally, there is evidence of a missing complementarity between Guatemala’s skills 
and its technology base. That is, for the period 1970-2002 the quality of Guatemala’s 
physical capital stock decreased by about 20 percent. Prominent explanations for this 
decline are the destructive impact of the civil war, and a negative investment climate 
due to an unstable policy environment and a lack of good governance. The apparent -61- 
gap between the evolution of quality of labor and physical capital could be a key 
factor for decreased output growth during the past decades. Decreased efficiency in 
capital accumulation also tends to reduce the returns to education, in particular for 
primary schooling. Hence, measures to stimulate investment and imports of foreign 
capital goods  — for example by reducing trade distortions and improving the 
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Appendices 
1. Guatemala: Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test for Unit Roots 
  ADF test statistic 
Variables     Levels  First differences 
log y  -2.24  -4.87** 
log k  -1.85  -4.36** 
log k (4 percent depreciation)  -1.76  -4.38** 
log k (disaggregated estimate)  -1.33  -2.99* 
log k (quality adjusted)  -2.04  -2.97* 
log h   -0.23  -2.97* 
log h (Barro and Lee)  -0.72  -4.76** 
log h (Cohen and Soto)  -1.49  -4.54** 
log primary schooling  -1.18  -3.37** 
log secondary schooling  -0.07  -3.23** 
log tertiary schooling  -1.35  -4.33** 
log life expectancy  -2.41  -4.25** 
log trade volume/GDP  -1.91  -4.21** 
log terms of trade  -2.03  -5.20** 
log capital imports/investment  -2.05  -4.74** 
log military expenditure/GDP  -1.45  -5.17** 
** (*) Rejects the hypothesis of a unit root at the 1 (5) percent significance level assuming 1 lag in the test 
equation, constant included. The MacKinnon critical values are  –3.59 (-2.93) at the 1 (5) percent level. -71- 
 
 
2. Guatemala: Data Sources of Time Series  
Variables  Abbreviation  Source 
Gross domestic product 
(GDP) (in 1958 Quetzals) 
Y  Banco de Guatemala. 
 
Capital stock (in 1958 
Quetzals) 
K  Perpetual inventory estimates, see text. 
Gross fixed capital formation 
(in 1958 Quetzals) 
I  Banco de Guatemala. Aggregated data is for 1950-2002, 
disaggregated information applies for 1970-2002. 
 
Annual rental rates  vi,t  Calculations are based on Morán and Valle (2002) data set for 
implicit price estimates, and Banco de Guatemala for 
disaggregated gross fixed capital formation and real interest 
rates.  
Physical capital quality index  zq  Estimated, see text. 
Imports (in 1958 Quetzals)  IM  Banco de Guatemala. 
Imported capital goods (in 
1958 Quetzals) 
IMcap  Banco de Guatemala. 
Exports (in 1958 Quetzals)  EX  Banco de Guatemala. 
Commodity terms of trade 
(1970=100) 
ToT  CEPAL and CIEN (Centro de Investigaciones Económicas 
Nacionales). 
Military expenditure (in 1958 
Quetzals) 
MILexp  Ministry of Defense expenditures are calculated from Banco de 
Guatemala, as reported in Memorias de Labores del Banco 
Central. The data compares favorably with information from 
the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).  
Life expectancy at birth 
(years)  
  World Bank (2002). 
Average schooling (years)  h  Perpetual inventory estimates, see text. 
Participation of primary, 
secondary and tertiary 




Perpetual inventory estimates, see text. 
Population statistics (15 and 




CEPAL and CELADE (2000). 
 
Continued on following page. 
     -72- 
 
     
Variables  Abbreviation  Source 
Labor force, total  L  Derived from the number of private contributors to the IGSS, 
see text. Data for 1960-2002 is taken from Banco de Guatemala 
(2003). Data for 1955-1959 is obtained directly from IGSS. 
Missing values for 1950-1954 were derived from SEGEPLAN 
(1978). 
Labor quality index  hq  Author’s calculations, see text. The weights are taken from 
Table 6, columns 2, 4 and 6. 
Primary and secondary gross 





For 1960-1990 UNESCO estimates as reported in World Bank 
(2002). For 1991-2002 Ministerio de Educación (various years) 
and UNDP (2002). Primary gross enrollment ratios are that of 
nivel primaria. Secondary gross enrollment ratios are that of 
nivel básico. Missing values were completed with information 
provided in UNESCO (various), Mitchell (1998) and Ministerio 
de Educación and SEGEPLAN (1980). 
Tertiary gross enrollment ratio 
 
TER  For 1960-1987 UNESCO estimates as reported in World Bank 
(2002). Missing values were either interpolated or completed 
with information provided in Mitchell (1998), UNESCO (1966) 
and UNESCO (various). For 1988-2002 ratio of students at San 
Carlos University (USAC) to the number of persons aged 20-
24, as reported in Global Info Group (1999) and UNDP 
(2003a).  -73- 
3. Guatemala: Time Series, 1950-2003 
 -74- 
 
4. Central America and Mexico: Sources of Growth, 1961-2000 (in percent) 
Data Adjusted for Quality of Labor 
a/ 
Contribution of  Contribution of  Country and 
time period 
GDP 




growth  Capital  Labor  TFP 
Guatemala    (0.33)  (0.67)      El Salvador    (0.42)  (0.58)   
1961-70         5.5         1.4  5.0  -0.9    1961-70  5.6  2.8  2.9  0.0 
1971-80  5.7  2.0  5.0  -1.3    1971-80  2.3  3.0  1.8  -2.6 
1981-90  0.9  0.5  1.4  -1.0    1981-90  -0.4  0.7  1.9  -3.0 
1991-00  4.1  1.2  1.6  1.3    1991-00  4.6  2.0  2.3  0.3 
                     
Nicaragua        (N.A.)      (N.A.)      Honduras        (N.A.)  (N.A.)   
1961-70  6.8  2.9  3.0  0.9    1961-70  4.8  2.0  2.3  0.5 
1971-80  0.4  1.8  2.5  -3.9    1971-80  5.4  2.2  2.9  0.3 
1981-90  -1.4  0.8  2.4  -4.7    1981-90  2.4  1.1  3.9  -2.6 
1991-00  3.3  0.7  3.2  -0.6    1991-00  3.2  1.8  2.9  -1.5 
                     
Costa Rica    (0.26)  (0.74)      Mexico    (0.41)  (0.59)   
1961-70  6.1  1.9  3.3  0.9    1961-70  6.7  3.3  2.7  0.7 
1971-80  5.6  2.4  4.5  -1.3    1971-80  6.7  3.5  3.1  0.2 
1981-90  2.4  1.0  2.9  -1.5    1981-90  1.8  1.7  3.5  -3.4 
1991-00  5.3  1.5  2.4  1.4    1991-00  3.5  1.6  1.9  0.1 
Source: Author’s calculations for Guatemala. Loayza et al. (2002) for Central America and Mexico — data here refers to the growth 
accounting exercise 2 (adjustments for changes in the quality of labor associated with increases in educational attainment). a/ Factor 
shares are in brackets. Discrepancies are due to rounding. -75- 
 
 
5. Guatemala and Chile: Sources of Growth, 1971-2000 (in percent) 
Data Adjusted for Quality of Capital and Labor 
a/ 
Contribution of    Contribution of  Country and 
time period 
GDP 




growth  Capital  Labor  TFP 
Guatemala    (0.33)  (0.67)      Chile    (0.44)  (0.56)   
1971-75         5.6         1.5  3.6  0.5    1971-75  -2.0  1.1  0.3  -3.5 
1976-80  5.7  1.5  6.4  -2.1    1976-80  6.8  0.7  3.4  2.7 
1981-85  -1.1  0.2  -0.7  -0.5    1981-85  -0.1  1.5  2.2  -3.8 
1986-90  2.9  -0.1  3.5  -0.4    1986-90  6.5  1.9  3.7  0.9 
1991-95  4.3  1.1  0.6  2.6    1991-95  7.5  4.1  1.9  1.4 
1996-00  4.0  1.8  2.6  -0.4    1996-00  ...  ...  ...  ... 
Source: Author’s calculations for Guatemala. Roldós (1997) for Chile. a/ Factor shares are in brackets. Discrepancies are due to rounding. 
 